

The Rhetorical Conflict Resolution and the 1904 Okuma Doctrine*

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INTRODUCTION

The Meiji Restoration (1868) was not merely a structural change opening Japan's doors to other nations, but domestically it also brought back to power the Emperor, who replaced the Shogun who had hitherto governed the nation based on a policy of seclusion. Historians praise the Restoration on the grounds that it unified the nation for purposes of modernization.¹⁾ Yet, because the Restoration combined two conflicting communities of belief, it also engendered an ideological conflict. On the one hand, the Restoration identified the Japanese as "a chosen people" under the Emperor; on the other hand, relative to the technologically superior Western powers, it acknowledged the Japanese as "not a chosen people." If so, what was the result of that combination of contradictory ideas? How did the Japanese rhetors of the Meiji era (1868-1912) identify the nation when they spoke to the citizenry? And what rhetorical devices were employed to fulfill the needs of the listeners? An attempt to answer these questions may lead to a better understanding of modern Japanese rhetoric, because the Meiji Restoration was the virtual start of Japan's modernization and Westernization and must have influenced its leaders' rhetorical communication as they attempted to move its people toward a consciousness of national unity. This

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1) Some historians praise the Restoration drama by pointing to the fact that it experienced few bloody struggles and few cases of corruption. See, for example, Toru Haga, *Meiji ishin to nihonjin* [*The Meiji Restoration and the Japanese People*] (Kodansha, 1988).

essay is an attempt to elucidate some dominant elements of the Meiji Restoration that would characterize Japanese political rhetoric of that early modern era, as exemplified in the 1904 speech of Shigenobu Okuma, one of the most influential political figures of that period.

Shigenobu Okuma's 1904 speech is perhaps one of the best discourses in which to find reflected the aftermath of the Restoration because of his efforts to cope with the contradiction of his fellow Japanese as "a chosen people" and "not a chosen people." Okuma had been the Prime Minister as well as the Foreign Affairs Minister and the Finance Minister of the nation ; as a result, Okuma had for years deliberated about his nation's course of direction in relation to the other nations in the world. In addition, Okuma is supposed to have gained office as Prime Minister through eloquence as one of the earliest practitioners of public speaking in politics. Robert Oliver, for example, says that Okuma "initiated the practice of speaking as a cabinet minister in the parliament."²⁾ Moreover, the speech was delivered on October 23, 1904, i. e., during the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5), during a time when Okuma could not ignore the relationship between Japan and other nations. Finally, the speech itself is well known as an expression "Okuma Doctrine" and is generally considered one of his most representative

2) Robert T. Oliver, *Leadership in Asia: Persuasive Communication in the Making of Nations, 1850-1950* (Newark: U of Delaware P, 1989), p. 43.

orations.³⁾

PREVIOUS STUDIES ON JAPANESE RHETORIC

Whether Japan has a rhetorical tradition or not has been a subject of debate since John Morrison wrote that rhetoric was absent from Japanese history. Morrison contends “that a rhetorical vacuum did exist in Japan prior to the 1950’s; the art of persuasion apparently has had no tradition in Japan. . . . [S]ome 1350 years of recorded history up to and roughly including World War II evidence no rhetorical tradition.”⁴⁾ Carl Becker claims that, from the viewpoint of “argumentation and debate,” the Japanese language “is less used to communicate than to commune, congratulate, emote, and to begin and end activities,” and then concludes that argumentation and debate are lacking in Japan.⁵⁾

The essence of these arguments is to try to discover something similar to Western rhetorical norms, conventions, or rules of thumb, which are treated as inherent to any rhetorical tradition but which are the fruits of trees rooted in Western communication culture, resulting in the failure to find

- 3) Shigenobu Okuma, “Toyo no heiwa o ronzu [Discussing Peace in the East],” in Waseda daigaku hensanbu (ed.), *Okuma haku enzetsu shu* [*Speeches of Marquis Okuma*] (Waseda UP, 1913), pp. 101-23. The editorial board selected 27 representative speeches of Okuma among others, one of which is the text that I examined and which I translated from the original Japanese transcript into English. The whole translation of the text is available in the appendix section following this essay. Excerpts from his Doctrine I quote in this essay are my translation. As to the label “Okuma Doctrine,” the editor of *Okuma haku enzetsu shu* notes that the speech was labeled as such because it resembled the “Monroe Doctrine” of the United States (p. 101). Others viewed the central thesis *per se* as the “Okuma Doctrine.” See, for example, Sukehiro Hirakawa, *Seiyo no shogeki to nihon* [*Western Impulse and Japan*] (Kodansha, 1985), p. 284.
- 4) John L. Morrison, “The Absence of a Rhetorical Tradition in Japanese Culture,” *Western Speech*, 36 (1972) : 89-102.
- 5) Carl B. Becker, “Reasons for the Lack of Argumentation and Debate in the Far East,” *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 10 (1986) : 75-91.

such Western-grown fruits in Japan. The failure is understandable, for argumentation theory, for example, has been intrinsic to the history of the West and has been learned by the children of Greece and Rome, and more specifically, of Aristotle. Ernest Bormann sees such a theory as “special” to a certain time and place, as he explains :

Aristotle’s special communication theory ... resembles most closely the contemporary model used for public speaking courses in American high schools and colleges. This is understandable since the special theory of public speaking has evolved in the 18th and 19th centuries in the United States that were modeled after the classical Greek and Latin forms.⁶⁾

Echoing Morrison’s conclusion, Roichi Okabe asserts that although “Japan has not witnessed the development of any indigenous rhetorical theory and practice,” there was a “task of promulgating the theory and practice of public speaking” of the Western sort.⁷⁾ In his later study of books on public speaking theory and practice in Meiji Japan, Okabe discovered that the Japanese, first, translated Western rhetorical theories, and then started to write their own ; and that, as a whole, the number of such books published started to increase ten years after the start of Meiji, peaked during the decade between 1887 and 1896, and decreased toward the end of the period.⁸⁾

My argument is that while these studies, which deal with the rhetorical theory and practice of the West, work to promote a better understanding of the history of Western rhetoric in Japan, there still is a need to broaden that

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- 6) Ernest G. Bormann, “Fantasy Theme Analysis and Rhetorical Theory,” *Rhetoric of Western Thought*, James L. Golden, Goodwin F. Bergquist, and William E. Coleman (eds.) (Dubuque, IA : Kendall/Hunt, 1976), pp. 463-4.
 - 7) Roichi Okabe, “Yukichi Fukuzawa : A Promulgator of Western Rhetoric in Japan,” *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, 59, (1973) : 186-95.
 - 8) Roichi Okabe, “The Impact of Western Rhetoric on the East : The Case of Japan,” *Rhetorica*, 8 (1990).

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perspective to include rhetorical criticism of indigenous discourses of that culture. That is, if this “rhetoric-as-a-Western-product” paradigm should be blindly accepted and applied to discourse, then it must be assumed that there had been no indigenous Japanese rhetorical theory and practice after all.

Huber Ellingsworth, who takes into account the link between communication and culture, has suggested such a broad definition of “rhetoric” :

Anthropologists, perhaps the most exciting and imaginative scholars working in the field of rhetorical theory, have defined national (cultural) rhetorics as the communication styles of a particular culture, including appropriate themes, modes of expression, standards, purposes, sources, and receivers of communication. Each culture has its own styles and standards which make its rhetorical system unique.⁹⁾

Satoshi Ishii agrees and indicates from this perspective that “even where there are societies and cultures which do not have formal studies [of rhetoric] as a systematized discipline, rhetorics do exist and are certainly functioning. Their existence and functions are organically linked with human society and culture, regardless of whether it is East or West, and the degree of its civilization.” This notion of rhetoric, apart from the post-Perry preoccupation, has enabled Ishii to explore, to discover, and to characterize the Japanese rhetorical canons as manifest in the Buddhist preaching

9) Huber W. Ellingsworth, “National Rhetorics and Intercultural Communication,” *Today's Speech*, 17 (1969) : 35-8.

style that existed before the Meiji era.¹⁰⁾ Likewise, the broad and inclusive perception of rhetoric makes possible the analysis of social movement discourse in Japan as well, because it allows the critic to examine any socially important rhetorical act regardless of the influence of Western rhetorical theories.¹¹⁾ Accordingly, this essay focuses on the indigenous text itself vis-à-vis the historical context in which it was produced.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The Opening of Japan

Before 1853, the United States was in need to open Japan's doors, in part because U. S. whalers desired ports in Japan in order to trade with China (the U. S. ships then depended on whale oil for their energy), and in part because Japan had been firing at the U. S. whalers that kindly tried to repatriate Japanese castaways. While recognizing that Western ships were sailing around the nation, the Shogunate was hesitant to establish a relationship with the West. The hesitation was strengthened by the Opium War,

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- 10) Satoshi Ishii, "Buddhist Preaching: The Persistent Main Undercurrent of Japanese Traditional Rhetorical Communication," *Communication Quarterly*, 40 (1992): 391-7. Ishii agrees with Oliver, also suggesting that the term "rhetorics" in the plural form be used because a rhetoric exists and is inherent in any given culture. Note, in passing, that earlier than Ishii, Akio Sawada had pointed out that, although the Buddhist preaching style of speaking is different from the Western oratorical tradition, it is, after all, one type of rhetoric or oratory. See Akio Sawada, *Ronbun no kakikata [How to Write a Thesis]* (Kodansha, 1977), p. 223.
- 11) For instance, Satoru Aonuma challenges the claims of Morrison and Okabe and contends that there has been a rhetorical practice of the narrative of *Momotaro*, or the Peach Boy, in a Japanese folklore, used by the fascist government of wartime Japan. Aonuma backs up his contention based on the indispensability of ideology in every human society, an obvious departure from the previous ethnocentric stance, allowing the critic to analyze the discourse itself in relation to its society. Satoru Aonuma, "The Narrative of *Momotaro*: Rhetorical Analysis of Japanese Fascist Folklore," *Human Communication Studies*, 18 (1990): 81-100.

which devastated China : The Shogunate was shocked to hear that China had been defeated in the Opium War with England and had been deprived of Hong Kong. The fear of the Shogunate was increasing at the time Commodore Perry arrived, and Perry's entry into Edo Bay is generally called *kuro-fune*, or "black ships," whose color connotes how fearful they looked. People expressed their fears in different ways ; some drew pictures of Perry who looked superior to their eyes, while others put their feelings into poetic words. Among the most well-known is the following poem which contains a double entendre : *Taihei no nemuri wo yaburu jokisen, tatta yo-hai de yorumo nemurezu.*¹²⁾ In oral-aural codes, *jokisen* means both (a) high-quality tea and (b) steam ships ; and *yo-hai* means both (a) 4 cups and (b) 4 ships. Thus, the poem means both (a) "The high-quality tea that breaks my peaceful sleep, and only 4 cups of it make it hard for me to get a good night's sleep," and (b) "The steamships that break into my peaceful sleep, and only 4 of them make it hard for me to get a good night's sleep."

Perry came back in 1854 as he had promised, this time with eight black ships. Awestruck, the Japanese agreed to negotiate. After several weeks of dickering, Shogunate officials signed the Treaty of Kanagawa, marking the end of Japan's seclusion. The Treaty was also an expression of the weakness of the Shogunate. Given the fear of the people and the action of the Shogunate, national opinion was divided into two ideological communities : *jo-i* or "Expel the Barbarians," and *kai-koku* or "Open the Country." Because supporting the open-doors policy meant supporting the Shogunate policy, the slogan was often spelled *sa-baku, kai-koku* : "Support the Shogun ; Open the Country." The *jo-i* group with the "Expel the Barbarians" slogan, on the other hand, responded negatively to the Shogunate policy. They viewed the Shogunate as shaky and wanted to establish a new government, strong enough to cope with the foreign pressure -- namely, government under the Emperor. Emperor Komei, who then lived in Kyoto, did not appreciate the "barbarians." Soon, the "Revere the Emperor" ideal-

12) Emphasis mine. Many historians quote this line as representing the fear of the people. See Haga, p. 33.

ogy joined the “Expel the Barbarians” ideology, resulting in the combined slogan *son-no jo-i*, or “Revere the Emperor ; Expel the Barbarians.” The people living in Kyoto had a reason to welcome the “Expel the Barbarians” ideology because Kyoto’s Nishijin brocade industry was damaged following Perry’s visits ; Western traders imported the raw silk previously used for the Nishijin brocade in large quantities.

But when the intellectuals recognized the great gap between the power of the Western nations and that of their own nation, the *jo-i* ideology grew steadily weaker and weaker, and more and more people came to recognize the importance of learning things Western to catch up with them. The agenda of debate thus became whether Japan should bring the Emperor back to power or the Shogunate should be continued ; i. e., which is the best way to achieve the goal of strengthening the nation now open to the West?

Because the southern domains of Japan (Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa, and Hizen) had been much exposed to advanced Western military power, had developed the *son-no jo-i* movement, and had strengthened their own military forces to guard against the West, the Shogunate forces could not defeat the anti-Shogunate forces of these powerful domains from the south. As a result, in 1867, the 15th Shogun Yoshinobu declared that he would return the administrative rights to the Imperial Court in 1867 ; the Emperor thus took over the throne and moved from Kyoto to Edo, whose name was changed to Tokyo. Upon resignation, the last Shogun stated :

Now that foreign intercourse becomes daily more extensive, unless the government is directed from one central authority, the foundations of the state will fall to pieces. If, however, the old order of things be changed, and the administrative authority be restored to the Imperial Court, and if national deliberations be conducted on an extensive scale, and the Imperial decision be secured, and if the empire be supported by the efforts of the whole people, then the empire will be able to maintain its rank and dignity among the nations of the earth.¹³⁾

13) Quoted in and translated by Harold S. Quigley, *Japanese Government and Politics: An Introductory Study* (New York : The Century Co., 1932), p. 20.

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Efforts were made to re-establish the dignity of the Emperor by joining the Imperial system with Shinto, a system of belief derived from a time-honored Japanese legend. Emperor-worship was encouraged, and the Meiji Constitution was established, defining the Emperor as "sacred."

Quigley explains: "Legend described the entire Japanese people as descended from the gods and the Yamato dynasty as having been commissioned by the gods to rule the country. It recorded the success of the Yamato domain in obtaining mastery over other domains during the early centuries, and thus established its title to the loyalty of the whole empire."¹⁴ Because the *kami* in Shinto is part of the Japanese legend, the concept of the *kami* best suited the unification rhetoric. Under the new system, the *kami* and the Emperor were joined together, which created the godliness of the Emperor. The Japanese did not have to pray; they were still protected if they had been born as Japanese and had faith, as the following poem suggested: *Kokoro dani makoto no michi ni kanai naba, inorazu tote mo kami ya mamoran.* ("If only thy mind accordeth with the true path, the *kami* will, without thy prayer, protect thee.")¹⁵ Okuma later said that this poem "was learned by heart by everyone,"¹⁶ implying the symbolic synthesis of the Emperor and Shinto. As long as they were born as Japanese and revered the Emperor as their *kami*, they were "a chosen people," the descendants of the Yamato dynasty.

Apace with this domestic spiritual unification, the nation's Westernization was rapidly occurring. After the 1854 treaty, missions were sent to the United States and Europe to learn things Western, which they brought back to Japan. One of those sent, Yukichi Fukuzawa, wrote some books on Western civilization, to which the Japanese responded enthusiastically; as he said: "contrary to all my expectations, these books were read

14) Quigley, p. 7.

15) Michizane Sugawara (845-903). Quoted in Shigenobu Okuma, *Fifty Years of New Japan* (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1910), p. 7.

16) Okuma, *Fifty Years*, p. 7.

widely and were even taken for guidance by the people of the day.”¹⁷⁾ Such works enabled the Meiji Japanese to situate themselves in relation to the West.

The gap between the two symbolic realities was great : As long as they revered the Emperor as their *kami*, they could see themselves as “chosen.” But once they turned their eyes to the West, they could not help identifying themselves as “not a chosen people.” This is what I call the rhetorical conflict, which was the newly emerging contradiction in belief created by the Meiji Restoration.

This contradiction defined the nation’s unique character during the Meiji period as Japan kept marching ahead through the Sino-Japanese War (1894-5) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5). Okuma’s 1904 speech was delivered at the time that the nation was involved in the latter war, the very first war with the “civilized white” in Japanese history.

Shigenobu Okuma

Okuma’s biography reveals that his life exemplifies the history of the nation’s changing consciousness. In 1838, fifteen years before Commodore Perry sailed into Japan, Okuma was born to a low-rank warrior family in Hizen, which had had a lot of contact with the Dutch and Chinese cultures even before the Meiji Restoration, although there was little diplomatic contact. The domains in that part of Japan had recognized the superiority of the Western powers and the possibility of their advancing into Japan much earlier than the rest of the nation. Such domains as Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa, and Hizen, therefore, had emphasized the importance of Dutch Learning.

In his youth in Hizen, Okuma went to a traditional school, called Kodokan, which encouraged Chu Tzu study, a branch of Confucianism that emphasized hierarchical structure, which suited the Shogunal strategy and, thus, became the official course of education shortly after the seclu-

17) Yukichi Fukuzawa, *The Autobiography of Yukichi Fukuzawa*, Eiichi Kiyooka (trans.) (New York : Columbia UP, 1966), pp. 334-5.

sion started in the early 1600s. The Hizen domain adopted this course of study, which was continued until the Restoration. Chu Tzu study promoted anti-democratic/pro-Shogunate ideology in the mind of the students. Okuma joined this school at the age of 16 in 1853, a couple of months before Perry came to Japan.

The following year, however, Okuma left Kodokan to join the secret union called the Gisai Domei, led by a philosopher named Shin'yo Edayoshi. Edayoshi's philosophy was totally opposite; he denied Confucianism including Chu Tzu study and advocated creation of a nation based upon central authority in the hands of the Imperial Court in Kyoto. The union, in other words, was the *son-no jo-i* group in Hizen; Okuma as well as some others, who would later become the high-ranking officials of the Meiji government, became its members. Under Edayoshi, his disciples learned *Kojiki* and *Nihonshoki*, which dealt with the Japanese genesis as told in the legendary mythology. Edayoshi also predicted that the Emperor would be brought back to power in the future and, thus, exhorted his disciples to study the history of the Imperial family and system.¹⁸⁾

It was becoming unrealistic to expel the foreigners as the years went by after the Kanagawa Treaty with Perry in 1854; accordingly, Okuma began to study Dutch, which he mastered and later taught. At the school of Dutch Learning, Okuma at first thought that the Westerners were superior to the Japanese only in the fields of military technology and that it would be necessary only to study technology to catch up with the West. However, Okuma soon realized that the Western powers were also superior to Japan in other fields, including systems of society, law (especially the Dutch Constitution), religion, and culture.¹⁹⁾ In the 1860s Okuma became convinced of the greater usefulness of English rather than Dutch, and the "teacher of Dutch turned student of English,"²⁰⁾ reflecting Okuma's attitudinal shift from

18) Kichijiro Watanabe, *Shigenobu Okuma* (Jiji Press, 1958), p. 11.

19) Watanabe, p. 12.

20) Smimasa Idditti, *The Life of Marquis Shigenobu Okuma: A Maker of New Japan* (Hokuseido Press, 1940), p. 57.

expelling the foreigners from Japan to learning from them.

Okuma's ideological life up to the time of the Meiji Restoration exemplified the process of societal change. Okuma first learned Chu Tzu, which supported the Shogunate. When Perry came to Japan, Okuma joined the secret union, reflecting an ideology committed to revere the Emperor and to expel the foreigners. But just as the leaders realized the impossibility of expelling the foreigners, so Okuma recognized this, learning Dutch, then English, as well as things Western. Upon the Restoration, therefore, Okuma stood on the side of the Emperor while, at the same time, he had absorbed the superior elements of Western civilization. Okuma, as I will later show, was caught up in the rhetorical conflict between "chosen" and "not chosen," just as the nation was.

The Emperor came back to power in 1868 under the name of Restoration, and a new government was established mainly by the southern domains. As Quigley notes, "The Restoration having been accomplished principally through the efforts of four clans, Satsuma, Choshu, Hizen and Tosa, it was but logical that they should become, as in fact they did become, the power behind the newly exalted throne."²¹⁾ But among these four domains there was a ranking that placed Satsuma and Choshu at the top, followed by Tosa, and then by Hizen, from which Okuma came.²²⁾ Because of Okuma's lineage, he had to depend on his eloquence and his wits. In the first year of Meiji, Okuma, a lower official of the government, luckily had a chance to negotiate with Sir Harry Parkes, the British Minister who had been asking Japan to guarantee the right of Christian missionaries to evangelize the Japanese. Higher officials had not been very successful in handling this issue. With his eloquence, however, young Okuma handled so well what had

21) Quigley, pp. 20-1.

22) When Satsuma and Choshu were fighting against the Shogunate forces for the Emperor to come back to power, Tosa joined the domains late, while Hizen forces were still hesitant, because Hizen's Domain Lord Nabeshima believed in Chu Tzu and thus supported the Shogunate. This is why Hizen was very late to join the Imperial forces, and thus was ranked fourth at the early stage of the Meiji period.

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created difficulties for his superiors and the event was so impressive to them that in the following year, 1869, “Okuma was named vice-minister of foreign affairs, with, as was customary, full authority and responsibility for conduct of the ministry.”²³⁾ Although from the fourth domain, Okuma gradually made himself credible to his superiors. Kimimochi Saionji, a statesman in power at that time, concludes: “Okuma had no military distinction and no backing from Hizen, but had achieved his position in the government by his eloquence and mental capacity.”²⁴⁾ Okuma became a member of the House of Councilors (1870), the Finance Minister (1873), founded the Reform Party (the first political party in Japan), became the Prime Minister and the Foreign Affairs Minister (1898), and, later, became the Prime Minister and the Interior Minister (1914). Given this historical context, how is the social reality of Meiji Japan reflected in Okuma’s 1904 speech? I explore this question in what follows.

THE OKUMA DOCTRINE : THE TEXT

Okuma begins his speech by talking about his personal involvement with the subject, about how happy he is about many people who have started to realize the importance of discussing the issues of East Asia, issues in which he has long been interested. Okuma then expresses the theme of his doctrine, linking East Asian issues to the Russo-Japanese War. And at the end of the introduction, Okuma narrows down the subject from the universal to the regional :

[T]he issue I am going to discuss today could be entitled “Japan’s Status in the World,” but this is too broad. To limit it a little bit, [I could discuss] “Japanese

23) Oliver, p. 39. See also Okuma ko hachijugonenshi hensankai (ed.), *Okuma ko hachijugo-nenshi* [Eighty-five Years of Prince Okuma] (Tokyo, 1926), p. 178.

24) Andrew Fraser, “The Expulsion of Okuma from the Government in 1881,” *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 25 (1967) : 214.

Influence on the Continent.” The term “Continent” is also somewhat ambiguous. I also considered the title “Influence in Asia,” but then the term “Asia” is also a little too broad. Consequently, I now think that it is more appropriate to deal with the issue of “Japanese Influence in East Asia.” (29-34)²⁵⁾

It is obvious that the central theme of Okuma’s doctrine is described by such nouns as “influence” or “status,” with which Okuma concerns himself as a leader of the nation, implying that Japan has not been influential or that it is important for Japan to become influential in the world, and that the first step is to exert influence in East Asia. In Okuma’s view, the Western powers are strong, while Japan is less so, which is frustrating. This feeling is best expressed in the following lines :

Japan is now trying to become one of the strong nations of this world, meaning it has not yet been. . . . No matter how grandly we talk of ourselves, unless we win the recognition of the world’s strong nations, we cannot be a strong nation. . . . We boast of ourselves, but nobody comes to us for advice. Important decisions concerning the issues of the world have been made among the other strong nations ; subsequently we are merely informed after everything was decided . . . (34-44)

As implied here, Japan wants to be, but not yet, recognized as one of the influential nations in the world.

The body of the speech develops along the following logical sequence : (1) Japan will win the Russo-Japanese War because Russia could be considered weak. (2) Winning this war is significant because of its implications for issues concerning China. (3) After Japan wins the war, the next issues to emerge will concern China and Korea. (4) After demonstrating its power

25) The numbers in the parentheses, and all the others hereafter, indicate the line numbers of the translated text attached as the appendix to this essay.

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by winning the war, Japan will be recognized as strong by the Western powers ; therefore, because of its pre-eminence and of its links to China, it is Japan that should act as the guardian in East Asia, and this purpose will be achieved under the Emperor of great tolerance and goodness.

Justifying the argument that Japan should act as the guardian in East Asia, Okuma uses the four-character word, which can be used as a slogan because it sounds proverbial and rhythmical.²⁶⁾ Okuma uses one four-character word in the discourse : *do-shu do-bun*. He says in part :

Stated in a Chinese fashion, it is "*do-shu do-bun*,"²⁷⁾ where "*do-shu*" means the same stock, and ["*do-bun*" means that] for 1,500 years we have depended very much upon China for literature, fine arts, religion, politics, academic learning especially moral education. Stated simply, your fathers would have been the followers of Mr. Confucius. If not, they must have been farmers or illiterates. . . . The Japanese and Chinese are "*do-shu do-bun*" [who have learned] at the same school. We have learned Chinese philosophy, Chinese literature, Chinese politics and all kinds of Chinese arts. Many of your family customs and traditions you have today are from China. Thus, no one can deny that this [Japanese] people is the most appropriate [guardian] to help develop China. Therefore, the Japanese shall say to the Chinese, "You are seriously diseased, poisoned by Buddhism and Confucianism. We have had the same diseases before. Then, we took the imported Western medicine, by which the diseases were cured. We have become 100 times better than before. So, we recommend that you also take this medicine." This [kind of exchange] can only take place between close relatives ; if this was said by a person whose race, customs and cultural background were different, no matter how friendly, there would be a feeling of doubt left [in the Chinese mind] a weakness of mankind. They would have doubts, such as, "Because crude missionaries once came and deceived us, they will probably do that again." But the Japanese are of the same stock, of the same school, and they are their closest relatives, and so they will honestly take care of China, and the Chinese people will put their trust in us. (230-268)

26) See Hirakawa, p. 98.

27) 同種同文.

In this passage, where the *do-shu do-bun* analogy works to justify Japan's becoming East Asia's guardian, Okuma dramatizes an ordinary conversation between a Chinese and a Japanese, in which the Japanese looks after the Chinese. This implies that Japan, once diseased, has now become strong; China remains diseased, but because both are close relatives, the weak should follow the good model and prescription offered by the strong, which justifies Japan's acting as the guardian in the region because the Japanese, of the same stock and culture, will be trusted to do so by the Chinese.

Near the end of the speech, the justification that Japan should look after China as its exclusive guardian is strengthened by the chosen-ness of the Japanese race, who are led by "the Japanese Emperor of the greatest tolerance and goodness." Referring to the likelihood of returning Manchuria back to China, Okuma says :

[T]his return is the Grace of our Emperor of the greatest tolerance and goodness given to the Chinese Emperor. . . . [But] until the Chinese Emperor exercises good politics and establishes a social order in China and until he promotes the nation's civilization, assimilates the nation's systems and institutions with the world's civilization, and becomes stable and independent enough to stand in the arena of competition with the Powers, Japan needs to be the guardian of China in order to fulfill its responsibility to preserve peace in the Far East. Therefore, it is important for the Chinese Emperor to lead the nation to civilization and prosperity, keeping in mind this friendly, sincere heart of the Japanese Emperor and the Japanese people . . . (472-489)

Central to these arguments is the implication that the Japanese are a chosen people led by "the Emperor of the greatest tolerance and goodness," and they are the people that must be trusted to act as the region's benevolent guardian by the people of China and Korea who are of the same stock and culture, of "*do-shu do-bun*."

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Recall that Okuma has earlier stated that Japan wants to be as strong as the West but “it has not yet been”; i. e., the West is superior to Japan in their power relationship. Then, as shown above, Okuma shifts his topic to the Japan-China and Japan-Korea relationships and sees Japan as having recovered from disease and China and Korea as still suffering. My argument here is that by such a shift, Okuma attempts to satisfy his own as well as his audience’s psychological needs, which is the resolution that Okuma makes in order to cope with the rhetorical conflict between “chosen” and “not chosen.” The Japanese military expansionism was thus justified in the symbolic reality of the Okuma Doctrine. This interpretation of Okuma’s speech corresponds to the arguments some, past or present, or Japanese or not, have advanced: i. e., the West is Japan what Japan is to Korea or to China. Shyu Kishida is concerned with this superior-inferior relationship that has dominated Japanese political thought since the Perry incident. He argues that the Japanese tried to reproduce the West-Japan, that is, strong-weak, relationship in the form of the Japan-Korea relationship by identifying themselves with the Westerners whom they feared, by Westernizing Japan, and by Japanizing Korea to reconstruct their own identity once destroyed by the “Perry shock.”²⁸⁾ Kishida’s assumption seems right, considering the way the nineteenth-century Westerners, especially Christian evangelists, viewed the Japanese as suffering from “diseases” and needing, in Okuma’s vocabulary, “medicine.” For instance, one of the American missionaries, S. Wells Williams, in an 1837 expedition to Japan before Perry’s arrival, had said that the expedition’s purpose was “to cultivate a friendly intercourse, *heal their diseases if they are willing to be operated upon*, and trade a little.”²⁹⁾ Recall what Okuma let the Japanese say to the Chinese in his hypothetical story: “You are seriously diseased, poisoned by Buddhism and Confucianism (257-258).” What is more, the

28) Shyu Kishida, *Monogusa seishin bunseki* [*Psychoanalysis by a Lazy Fellow*] (Chuokoronsha, 1982), p. 19.

29) Emphasis mine. Quoted in William L. Neumann, *America Encounters Japan: From Perry to MacArthur* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 12.

shift of that relativistic power formula—the West is superior to Japan, which is superior to Korea or China—had been pointed out by the British Minister Parkes. Parkes had scrutinized the 1876 Japanese Treaty with Korea and made the following remarks :

Article 10 is specially noteworthy, as showing that the Japanese Government, who have lately complained of the extra-territorial clauses of foreign Treaties with Japan, have been careful to stipulate for the right of jurisdiction over their own people in Korea. They have also imitated those Treaties in not making this right reciprocal, as the Foreign Minister has explained to me that this article does not give the Koreans jurisdiction over their people in Japan. It is, in short, almost a repetition of articles 4 and 5 of the British Treaty of 1858 with Japan. The resemblance between this Treaty and the British Treaty of 1858 with Japan is remarkable.³⁰⁾

In his Doctrine, Okuma also tries to “Japanize” China and Korea while trying to Westernize Japan. That interpretation seems to explain why Okuma uses a number of examples describing how “weak, devastated, and politically unsuccessful” China and Korea have been. For example, Okuma says :

“Korean pottery,” which still remains today, is indeed a treasure. This fact implies that they must have been dexterous with more techniques than this. They also had great literary works. It is not an easy technique to produce such pottery. But why have they become as they are today? It is because their politics are bad that they have been devastated. (272-277)

30) Quoted in F. V. Dickins and S. Lane-Poole, *The Life of Sir Harry Parkes, Vol. II: Minister Plenipotentiary to Japan and China* (London: MacMillan, 1894), pp. 204-5.

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The same is true of China. Because their politics are bad, their literature, technology, and all other areas have gradually stagnated. Chinese textiles, pottery, arts, and all other crafts used to be quite flourishing, but these started to go down about 200 years ago, resulting in their being very weak today.³⁰⁾

However, even though Okuma sees the Japanese as “chosen” relative to “weaker” neighbors such as China and Korea, there was still a rhetorical problem; relative to the Western powers, the Japanese are not yet a chosen people. But by winning this Russo-Japanese War, the very first war with the “civilized” West, they will be a chosen people, because the West will, as Okuma states, recognize the Japanese as strong.

The question, then, is, what makes his audience believe that the Japanese will win this war and will be a chosen people? The answer to this question for Okuma seems to be depiction of the nation as ruled by a benevolent monarch, the Emperor. At times, Okuma uses phrases that connote the respectability and authoritativeness of the Emperor. The best example would be the doctrine’s peroration, which is highly Shintoistic :

[T]he Japanese people as a whole are hoping, under the free competition and under the interests of the [Western] Powers, to develop Far Eastern civilization and to increase its wealth. It is indeed the hope of the Japanese people that international distrust, racial jealousy, and religious deception will significantly disappear; that this will promote the profits to be globally shared and will shed the light of peace on the people of the Far East as soon as possible; and that these will eventually come as a result of the triumph of our Imperial forces. We, the Yamato tribe, believe that the accomplishment of this purpose is a task worthy of our lives, our calling from Heaven. (Big applause.) (509-517)

In Okuma’s depiction here, the Japanese are a chosen people, the descendants of the Yamato dynasty described in Shinto legends, and because of this, the war arguably seems to be justified. Therefore, winning this war,

which will bring peace in East Asia, is a calling from Heaven given to the Japanese, and only when the work is done under the rule of the Emperor will Japan be entitled to guide its neighboring nations. For Okuma, this is the way to resolve the conflict and affirm that his people are, indeed, a chosen people. Thus, in the depicted psychosocial reality, "being a chosen people" seems to justify the war and Japan's guardianship in East Asia based on its military expansionism, and, at the same time, "wanting to be a chosen people" also seems to justify the same role Japan is playing, which is the essence of the Okuma Doctrine.

A WRAP

After the Perry incident, Japanese leaders were divided over whether to open the country or to expel the foreigners and over whether to support the Shogunate or to revere the Emperor. Okuma's life reflected that ambivalence. First, he joined the group that emphasized the importance of national unity under the Emperor by expelling the foreigners; then, he started to learn things Western. With the Meiji Restoration came a conflict in the nation's psychosocial reality: as subjects of the Emperor, they were a chosen people; but as compared to Westerners, they were deficient.

The rhetorical conflict engendered by the Meiji Restoration produced the Okuma Doctrine, which "resolved" that conflict. Central to the Doctrine's rhetorical strategy is the two-fold teleology. First, the Japanese should fight and win the Russo-Japanese War in order to become a chosen people. In Okuma's terms depicting Japan's change from being not chosen to chosen, Japan used to be "diseased," took "Western medicine," and has become strong, but has not yet been recognized as strong as the Powers, and by the Powers; thus, it was urgent and necessary for Japan to defeat one of the Powers, Russia, so that Japan can play a role consummate with its chosenness.

The other way in which Okuma tries to resolve the conflict is to emphasize the present chosenness of the Japanese by weaving a persuasive cloth

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based on warps and wefts. The vertical threads are the “guardian” argument based on the Japanese chosen-ness stemming from the Yamato line, and the horizontal threads are the idea of “*do-shu do-bun*” that the Japanese are of “the same stock and culture.” To Okuma, it is only the Japanese, a nation of the chosen people, who should take care of and cure the “sick relatives” of China and Korea benevolently, justifying and urging support for the war.

Stated simply, the Japanese are not yet a chosen people because the Western Powers have not recognized them as strong and, thus, Japan needs to fight and win this war. But, at the same time, the Japanese are a chosen people because they are descended from the State of Yamato and are serving the Emperor and, therefore, are entitled to “guard” the East Asian area against the Russian military expansion by fighting this war. In either way, the idea of Japan’s military expansionism was the answer to resolve the rhetorical conflict that had cropped up on the Meiji Restoration. No matter how illogical and unreal it may seem, this was the special teleology in the psychosocial reality that the rhetor of Meiji Japan could not rescind.

“The Okuma Doctrine”*

By Shigenobu Okuma

October 23, 1904

Gentlemen,⁽¹⁾ it should please us that Chinese and Korean issues have recently gained our serious attention, especially that the issues of Manchuria and Korea have drawn attention from politicians, scholars, and even entrepreneurs and others. I have been studying Chinese issues for almost ten years or so, and until recently, our society did not attend to these [issues]. These days, however, the whole society has come to put much more emphasis on these issues, which is quite pleasing to us altogether. But more than anything else, the incident that is the most important to understand these issues is this war⁽²⁾ going on, which relates to the “safety or danger” and “honor or shame”⁽³⁾ of our nation ; what the outcome of this war is of our most serious concern. If we lose, China and Korea would be of our less concern, as we would have to concern ourselves with defending our coastal lanes, which would be a difficult problem, the most serious problem that is placed before the Japanese people. But I firmly believe that we will certainly win this war, and needless to say, so do those concerned. Especially, our army is fighting on and on with the greatest confidence possible and therefore, by the power of our brave Japanese army and our courageous and intelligent officers, we will, no doubt, win. However, winning this war cannot determine everything. Today’s world is controlled not just by Japan and Russia ; we must not forget that besides Japan and Russia, there are other strong and great nations in the world. To indicate what great nations there are in the world today and how many of these strong nations there are, I must count seven or eight on my fingers, the condition of which is somewhat like the seven warring countries during the Chun-Chiu Turbulent Age in China. In Europe there are six great nations : England, France, Germany, Russia, Austria, and Italy. Adding the United States of North America makes the seven great nations. Like the seven warring countries of China — although, of course, these [Western nations] are not currently fighting each other, the situation appears to be quite as turbulent. And since Japan in the Far East is now trying to join these seven great nations to make itself the eighth, this war cannot be understood merely as a two-nation matter; it is the world’s problem. Consequently, the issue I am going to discuss today could be entitled “Japan’s Status in the World,” but this is too broad. To limit it a little bit, [I could discuss] “Japanese Influence on the Continent.” The term “Continent” is also somewhat ambiguous. I also considered the title “Influence in Asia,” but then the term “Asia” is also a little too broad. Consequently, I now think that it is more appropriate to deal with the issue of “Japanese Influence in East Asia.” Japan is now trying to

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become one of the strong nations of this world, meaning it has not yet been. Even 35
though we win the war and we say to ourselves that we are a strong nation, it doesn't
follow our nation has become such ; only when those presently strong nations recog-
nize Japan as strong will our nation have become strong. No matter how grandly we
talk of ourselves, unless we win the recognition of the world's strong nations, we
cannot be a strong nation. In other words, only when we come to have a voice in 40
world affairs will we be able to stand among the world's strong nations. We boast of
ourselves, but nobody comes to us for advice. Important decisions concerning the is-
sues of the world have been made among the other strong nations ; subsequently we
are merely informed after everything was decided, we can hardly say we are a
strong nation. The question is, whether or not Japan can come to hold such a status. 45
Thus, this war! Let me talk about the characteristics of this war. Since I am not a
soldier, I shall not discuss it from a military perspective. I would rather explain it
briefly. Russia is almost like a medieval European nation. When I made a public
speech elsewhere last November, I stated that Russia is analogous to Mongolia, that
Russian military is Mongolian, that the Russian military organization is like that of 50
Mongolia, and that the Russian autocracy is also like that of Mongolia. It is hard to
imagine that, although Mongolian power died out about five centuries ago, the
equivalent power still remains in today's Russia. With the logic of evolutionism, it is
even harder to see why such a medieval thing has continued to this day. This
perhaps comes from some kind of diplomatic relationship. That is, Russia displays 55
its power to the world based merely upon the balance of influence in international re-
lations, and, although its actual power is already lost, its influence continues in ex-
istence as if by inertia. What about Japan's influence? It is a new power--a newly
emergent power. Its nationality consists in having applied all of the world's civiliza-
tions and scientific discoveries, in having shaken itself free from the medieval 60
autocratic, feudalistic structure, in having already started to practice constitutional
politics with the Constitution and the religious freedom.

Reading history reveals that after the great French revolution, autocratic powers
gradually lost their energy, and at least since 1848, almost all of them have died out.
Put in fashionable words, the tenacious resistance of Austria and the Ottoman Em- 65
pire failed, resulting in constitutional politics. Nevertheless, Russia alone did not
change its system at that time because the nation is prejudiced in favor of conserva-
tive tendencies, and because the Slavs are basically deficient in political philosophy.
Also, [conservative tendencies go on in Russia] because the lay of its land makes it
easy to defend and difficult to be attacked and because the Western European nations 70
have made too much of Russian ability considering the failure of Napoleon, I
believe. However, that this sort of power may compete with a new power and win is
quite paradoxical to the logic of evolutionism. [Russia is a nation that] exists in Eu-

rope with Mongolian/Asian characteristics as a vestige of the medieval period.
75 Therefore, it is indeed a strange phenomenon that this [Russia] will be defeated by
Japan, who possesses the world's most advanced [Western] civilization ; i. e., [it is
strange] that the Slavs, who belong to Europe, are doing their work at the Asian
level and will be defeated by Japan, who lives in Asia and is breathing the air of the
new [European] civilization. But this is the truth and agrees with the principle of ev-
80 olution.

Therefore, I strongly believe that we will win this war. And when we win, what
will be the status of Japan in the world, which has been my concern? If I were allow-
ed to speak quite frankly and express my own ideal and my own hope, I would say
that I would like the Japanese Empire to have a sufficient voice in all world affairs.
85 But how probable is it for Japan to win such power in one act is a difficult question.
Thus, I would yield a step or two and say that I would like the Japanese Empire to
gain sufficient influence over the East Asian region. Because I may sound modest,
some of you might say Okuma has grown old. Nevertheless, I would like to forego
assertions beyond that point as a first step. Consider how the United States of Amer-
90 ica won independence from England and has developed gradually to gain their position
; I would like you to consider what status that nation has gained in relation to to-
day's world. As you are aware, American President Monroe made a declaration call-
ed the "Monroe Doctrine," which is revered in the United States of America. This is
a manifesto in which he declared that the United States shall not permit any Europe-
95 an intervention in regions of American influence and that it, in turn, shall not inter-
vene in European affairs. Even the United States of America is [limited in] this
way ; thus, it is too great an illusion to imagine that Japan will gain influence all over
the world through its suddenly emerging power and want to exercise its authority
over all facets of world affairs.

100 Doubtless, however, through victory in this war, we will certainly achieve the
goal of making it impossible for any other strong nation to ignore the Japanese gov-
ernment and to behave arrogantly in East Asia. But we should be clearer on this
point to achieve this goal. As history too tells us, there are cases in which things do
not turn to a nation's advantage even though that nation has achieved a certain statu-
105 s, because its diplomacy has not been commensurate. But if the people of the nation
have progressed enough and the power of the people always follows and sup-
ports the government, this country's diplomacy succeeds. I believe that diplomacy
which proceeds at the same pace as the citizenry's rising consciousness about foreign
affairs will lead to one success after another. Thus, the Japanese people should,
110 first of all, notice that Japanese preeminence has the enthusiastic support of the peo-
ple, which leads to world recognition of its status ; only when any strong nation
comes to recognize the Japanese power, will a Japanese word and action begin to in-

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fluence the world concerning Eastern problems.

Now, as soon as Japan's status is decided, the problem shifts to the domain of China and Korea that you have discussed often. Japan will win! It will certainly win, because it will defeat the one who, while going with currents of world civilization, opposes that very civilization; as Confucius says, a Good man follows a Good path.⁽⁴⁾ They speak with no Goodness, while we act with Goodness. With Goodness, we confront our neighbors, whose poor people, seriously diseased, reside around us. Yet, to cope with this situation, the young tend to advocate invasion. Their argument points out that while morality on the personal level has progressed, international morality never progresses; that [war] is trickery after all, that there is no such thing as a war of righteousness, as in Chun Chiu, that the strong always win, and that Japan has become so strong that it should invade and plunder its neighbors. This is quite surprising. It is absolutely wrong to argue that international morality does not exist! Even if there are those who praise trickery in certain cases, it is rash to decide, by giving one or two examples, that the whole of international morality is a primitive idea.

Today, in the twentieth century, Machiavellian trickery is no longer acceptable. If one nation invades another, then it follows, surely, that, as in a vendetta, it will be invaded by some other nation. Any nation who has invaded another with armed forces has never succeeded with a good result at any time in our history. A Russian invasion [policy in this regard] is unreasonable, [a policy] with which Japan disagrees and says, we shall be the guardians of our neighbors. And some people say that as soon as we start a war with these words in mind, we then imitate the Russians and invade [our neighbors]. What a shame that would be! Even a supreme ruler would never do this, nor would a king!

Human desires are quite surprising. What did the Russian Emperor declare? He declared the liberalization of China for the maintenance and preservation of China. He declared this over and over again. He declared this in 1900. His Minister of Foreign Affairs Lamsdorf⁽⁵⁾ sent the same response to the American Secretary of State. Former President McKinley sent the Circular about the Chinese liberalization to the Powers, with which Lamsdorf enthusiastically expressed agreement. Nevertheless, their plan to invade China had already been made ready. They, the Russian Emperor, the Foreign Minister, the Cabinet, and especially the General Headquarters, had drawn lines on a map and indicated, let this all be Russian land. But they still advocated the preservation of China on the surface, without mentioning the invasion. It is indeed a frightening nation. Regarding this matter of China, I strongly feel it necessary to express once again my own views.

In 1898, I attempted to make a public speech at the Toho Society, the script of which has been printed in the Society's journal and has even been translated into

English for American and European newspapers. The outline of my argument was that a nation is not destroyed by outside forces but a nation ruins itself without being destroyed from the outside. There I stated that it is like a parasite in a lion. Here is
155 what that means: A lion is said to be the king of all animals and once this beast roars, all other animals are frightened. But it still falls down, if a parasite breeds in its body. That is, the beast falls down of its own accord. This is what I mean by “a parasite in a lion.” China, which is the biggest empire in the world with its 400 million people, can hardly be destroyed. Even Napoleon once worried that China would
160 eventually control the world. So, China will not fall so easily, nor will any strong nation be able to destroy it. However, China lost its huge land in such a short period as one century. Two hundred years ago, a mighty invader named Peter the Great attempted to invade the northern part of China. In response, the Chinese Emperor Kongci sent his troops, which drove back these [Russians]. Russia failed entirely
165 and was embarrassed. The Treaty of Nerchinsk was humiliating to Russia and most honorable to China. Peter the Great, swallowing an insult, concluded this treaty, which was honorable to the people of China. However, one hundred years later, when the descendants of the Emperor Kongci lived, the situation turned out to be that the nation [China], which had once avoided invasion, was deprived of the Amur
170 River. Fifty years later, [it was deprived] of Janhaizhou; and subsequently, of land near Vladivostok by Russia, which took advantage of Chinese difficulties at that time. As this shows, in one hundred years China lost an enormous amount of land, about twenty times as much as the landmass of Japan. This was neither because China was forced by the [Russian] military power nor as a result of fighting; it was
175 entirely due to foreign diplomacy without any use of armed forces. Russian diplomacy is considerably great. In this way, a nation self-destructs. Not from the outside; but from the inside. It is not destroyed; it self-destructs. It is said that Rome was destroyed by barbarians, but that is not true. Simply, it was when Rome had already decayed that the northern enemy invaded. A thing first decays, and then a parasite
180 breeds in it, meaning that it is not killed, but it dies. The same is true of how a nation dies. This is the outline of what I stated.

At that time [when I made the speech], an argument for a partition of China predominated, whereupon I took the position that such a partition of China was an impossibility. Rather, I advised that China be encouraged so that it would not die.
185 That was the period when spheres of influence and land partition were being advocated, which I stated were wrong; [I stated] especially that diplomats are the most misleading; and that this is not the kind of thing that a magician does, taking away somebody else's land merely by drawing some lines on a sheet of paper. And in Berlin, a conference was held among the Powers to decide the partition of Africa.
190 This was when the phrase “sphere of influence” was coined, along with some other

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diplomatic terms. They set a table in front of Bismarck, drew lines on a map with their own pencils saying : This is for England, this for Germany, this for France, and so on, and decided on which part each nation should take. Those pencil lines drawn on the map have been realized. This is not surprising, because the country Africa has a lot of blank areas as you have seen on your map. They are not painted black. Their not being black means that there is little to write about those areas or that people seldom explore those areas. For diplomats to partition this kind of place can be decided arbitrarily on a map. But China has 4, 000 years of history and 400 million people. So it is difficult to imagine why the smartest diplomats have forgotten this. China is different from Africa. They cannot do such a stupid thing. 195 200

Therefore, I then judged that the spheres of influence of the Powers are like a deed without a legal seal on it. But since I, at the same time, denounced Japan because it had promised not to cede Fujian Province, every newspaper denounced me as being troublesome. The public attack on me became greater, because I was the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the very person concerned at that time. But since I am an honest man, I merely stated what I thought. I spoke the truth because there is no way whatsoever to insist on the right of possession with a deed without a legal seal on it. 205

Then I advocated that it would be troublesome to disturb China because the nation is like a hornet's nest ;⁽⁶⁾ thus, it should be kept calm and gently tended. In this way, it is necessary to guide and develop the nation. This was my argument. 210

Now the important question is what kind of nation should be the teacher in order to guide and develop China ; or who should be the doctor or nurse to examine and cure this seriously diseased nation. There were some arguments concerned with this question : It should be England, which has a long time relationship, it should be Russia, which shares the national borderline, or, it should be America, who becomes a teacher to guide the nation in a friendly way. All of these are impossible. There are no nations in the world that could lead China to civilization. There are no nations in the world that could cure and heal this seriously diseased China. But if such a nation exists, it should be one, one and only. Who is this one and only? Japan! None but Japan! I have warned them of this as the Foreign Minister. And now this seems to have come close to realization. Only when Japan comes to possess influence over the Asian Continent and its work comes to be respected by the world will Japan kindly start to work on curing China. The reason why Japan is appropriate as the office to cure China, which is dying of a serious disease, is that our ancestors were no more than Chinese. Some people say that Japanese are the Aryan race. But we doubt the Arian argument as plausible. Whatever one may say, our blood is different from that of the Arian. Our blood may be mixed with the Arian blood a little bit, but still it is too crude a judgment to say that the Japanese race is the Arian race be 215 220 225

230 cause of that. Stated in a Chinese fashion, it is “*do-shu do-bun*,”⁽²⁷⁾ where “*do-shu*” means the same stock, and [“*do-bun*” means that] for 1,500 years we have depended very much upon China for literature, fine arts, religion, politics, academic learning especially moral education. Stated simply, your fathers would have been the followers of Mr. Confucius. If not, they must have been farmers or illiterates. This race, 235 the 50-million people, is mostly the followers of Mr. Confucius. People speak of Goodness and Righteousness as they have been enlightened by Mr. Confucius. This Goodness and Righteousness all came from Chinese philosophy, showing how great and influential this enlightenment has been. It has recently been common to speak ill of China, but this is unacceptable to me. It is true that China is not going well at 240 present, but it is too much and going too far to speak ill of Confucius because of this. Analogously, people speak ill of Christianity because the Pope exercised his power and devastated Christianity during the Medieval era. But we should not speak ill of Christ himself. Christ is a sacred figure. He attempted to save mankind from their sins. But as the Roman monks gained power, they committed a variety of sins 245 greater than those of the common people. I believe that it was those Roman monks who must have been sent to Hell. But it is too ruthless to denounce Christianity itself because of this. Likewise, it is not plausible to speak ill of Mr. Confucius just because the Chinese people, descendants of Mr. Confucius, have stagnated more or less. At any rate, the Japanese people are the followers of Mr. Confucius. Then, 250 what follows is that both Chinese and Japanese have entered the same gate of school; both are “*do-shu, do-bun*”; and both share the same master. Thus, it is, doubtless, appropriate to develop China by the hands of Japan. The Japanese and Chinese are “*do-shu do-bun*” [who have learned] at the same school. We have learned Chinese philosophy, Chinese literature, Chinese politics and all kinds of Chinese 255 arts. Many of your family customs and traditions you have today are from China. Thus, no one can deny that this [Japanese] people is the most appropriate [guardian] to help develop China. Therefore, the Japanese shall say to the Chinese, “You are seriously diseased, poisoned by Buddhism and Confucianism. We have had the same diseases before. Then, we took the imported Western medicine, by which the 260 diseases were cured. We have become 100 times better than before. So, we recommend that you also take this medicine.” This [kind of exchange] can only take place between close relatives; if this was said by a person whose race, customs and cultural background were different, no matter how friendly, there would be a feeling of doubt left [in the Chinese mind] a weakness of mankind. They would have doubts, 265 such as, “Because crude missionaries once came and deceived us, they will probably do that again.” But the Japanese are of the same stock, of the same school, and they are their closest relatives, and so they will honestly take care of China, and the Chinese people will put their trust in us.

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I believe that what is lacking in China today is political ability. It is because their politics are bad that their public morals have become corrupt. It is because their politics are bad that the citizens have become devastated. About 1,500 years ago, Korea was more advanced than Japan in the fields of arts and literature. For example, "Korean pottery," which still remains today, is indeed a treasure. This fact implies that they must have been dexterous with more techniques than this. They also had great literary works. It is not an easy technique to produce such pottery. But why have they become as they are today? It is because their politics are bad that they have been devastated. 270 275

The same is true with China. Because their politics are bad, their literature, technology, and all other areas have gradually stagnated. Chinese textiles, pottery, sculpture, arts, and all other crafts used to flourish, but these started to stagnate about 200 years ago, resulting in their being very weak today. Under the circumstances, in developing China, their politics must be improved in the first place, and the country who directs this is to be Japan! It is the duty of Japan, a calling from Heaven! And now the appropriate time has come for Japan to answer this calling! In healing and directing China, this is the time when no obstacle can be allowed to stand in our way. From another perspective, for Japan to direct China is Japan's expression of gratefulness to China. Although the time has come, there are those who advocate invasion, which is the worst obstacle, because it could create a consciousness of distrust in the Chinese mind. So, Japanese politicians and scholars should watch their mouths as well as their actions. As the imperial edict of this war declaration indicates, Japan, as well as the United States of North America and England, has announced its policy is to preserve China. The liberalization of China is not only the Japanese policy but also that of the world. It is almost like a fundamental policy of the world. To go against this policy means to lose China's emergent willingness to depend on Japan. This loss [of the policy] will be to the disadvantage of China, against Japan's will, and confusing peace. Subsequently, the Chinese people will disobey, and if they disobey, Japan can no longer keep quiet politically [and will prevent China from disobeying]. 280 285 290 295

This also applies to Korea. If the Korean sovereign and subjects misunderstand us against the sacred will of the Emperor of the greatest tolerance and goodness and come to believe that their land may be taken and to conspire against us, and if our enemy [i. e., Russia] notices this, or if they [i. e., Koreans] start saying that their country will be captured by the ambitious nation [i. e., Japan], then there will be no guarantee Japan will not get Korea. Does this mean Japan will destroy another nation? Never. It means Korea will self-destruct. Thus, the same is true of China. No matter how friendly Japan is approaching China, if the Chinese sovereign and subjects start saying that they are caught up in a trickery by the nation of ambition 300 305

[i. e., Japan] and then start to harm Japan, we can not be tolerant at all. Any ruler of the great tolerance and goodness would not temporize nor leave it unsolved. It is sometimes necessary to get a country and kill its people ; it is necessary to conquest the "Way-less." However, it does not mean to say that Japan has adopted a policy of invasion. The people who are ruled by the Emperor of the greatest tolerance and goodness should treat China in a friendly manner. China and Japan are "*do-shu, do-bun*" and have been enlightened by the same master for the past 1,500 years. We should make this spirit understood to China. Otherwise, there will be a great disaster. Thus, I think it is important to try to prevent the creation of distrust [in the minds of the Chinese].

By indicating this way, Japan will have the most responsibility in East Asia. Thus, I feel that it is necessary to tell you the terms of the peace treaty [that will be reached] as a result of this war. It might be a little early to talk about the terms of the peace treaty, but the time of peace will come sooner or later. Since Japan, as previously stated, will certainly win this war, I believe Japan can accomplish the goal of this war to a sufficient extent. It is not unimportant at all to consider what should be the terms of the peace treaty from today on. As long as Japan will have the status to guarantee the East Asian peace, we must put the highest priority on the terms of the peace treaty. The purpose of this war is never to invade the land and control its people by behaving as a superior ruler or something. As in the imperial edict for the war declaration, it is like the king's instruction : The first goal of this war must be to prevent this sort of war from repeating because we have started this war in order to make peace happen!

There is confusion whenever the Powers of the world internationally negotiate. Also, there is competition for profits. However, the Russian power influencing the East beyond the Ural Mountains is quite different in character from the usual international competitions and disputes among the civilized nations. This power was gained a few centuries ago by means of invasions into, and oppression onto the areas of the weakest power. This sort of power is blocked when it encounters a strong power, which is just like the water stream that changes its direction when it encounters a rock or a mountain, wanting to go west but turning east. North of Russia is limited in natural resources ; there is the Arctic Ocean. In the west, it [i. e., Russian power] was blocked when it faced the Ottoman Empire. As a result, one part of it went to the Black Sea. Turkey's power, then, was weak, and the oppression was directed to this weak place, which resulted in the occupation of [the] Crimean [Peninsula] and the Black Sea. Another part of its power turned to [the] Balkan [Peninsula]. As soon as it approached the Balkans, it was at first suppressed by the British power, and then by the coalition of the Powers. Up to this point, the Russian expansion to the west and to the south was completely blocked. This led Russia to Central

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Asia, and then to Afghanistan and India, while another part of it tried to reach the Persian Gulf, oppressing wherever it found weakness by means of violence. But this, again, was resisted by England, and they failed to realize their intention. The outcome, therefore, is that all of the Russian power has come to conquer Siberia, to oppress northern China, and eventually Manchuria and Korea. Then, taking advantage of the Sepoy Rebellion, Russia completely occupied Manchuria militarily. As these [instances] show, Russian expansion is different from the international competitions among the civilized Europeans in that Russia at any time avoids strong areas, aims at weak areas, and, wherever there is a chance, it immediately starts occupation. This is the Russian politics. And now Russia has just encountered the new power named Japan that has newly emerged in the East, resulting in this "Japan-Russian Clash."

Just as the Russian power damaged Poland and then moved towards Osman Turkey, Austria, and Hungary, towards the Balkans, and towards India, but was finally blocked by the European Powers such as England and Germany, so the Russian expansion in the Far East will be blocked by the new Eastern power named Japan. But this expansion movement will not stop at one or two failures; it is clear that whenever there is a chance, they will try again. This is even more so when looking at the Balkan example. This "Balkan" issue is based on the Conference of the Powers, but the balance of interests is not always stable. The balance of power may change depending on the circumstances. And when a conflict of interests happens, the coalition power of the West will be weak, even from an optimistic perspective. This, in other words, is the weakness of diplomacy, which Russia took advantage of in order to advance into the Balkans. Russia has spent its volcanic power to expand towards the west. But since this merely means that its volcanic activity is taking a rest, when the time comes, it will immediately burst into flames again. Even if it was not a single nation but a cooperation of several nations that would prevent this [i. e., Russia], the [Russian] activity could be stopped as long as the cooperation was based on their unity. But when the unity turns out to be shaky, Russia will immediately become active.

The same is true in the East. Russian expansion into the East is not pleasant to the world's capitalists—to England, America, or Germany, because the Russian power ruins commercial activity. As the Russian power grows, the world's commercial market, China, will suffer from severe taxation imposed by Russia. Thus, everyone disagrees with this. The disagreement is now expressed in the direction of China's preservation and the open-doors policy. The reason this open-doors policy has come about for discussion is because there is someone who wishes to close the doors; otherwise, it would not be necessary to argue on this! Notice, where there is a Russian flag, commerce is shut off! Therefore, the civilized and commercially

prosperous nations in the world are all against Russian expansion into the East. This is why various nations enthusiastically empathize with Japan in its fight against Russia. ⁽⁷⁾ Then, it would be the best for the Powers to cooperate and to suppress the Russian power. But then again, as in the Balkan case, although the cooperation of the powers sounds like it is strong, it is not actually as strong as it sounds. For example, England and France once cooperated and defeated Russia. England and France started a war with Russia, which was willfully invading someone else's country. This is the famous Crimean War, where Russia was defeated and signed a peace treaty in about three years. Forty years after that, however, Russia and ³⁹⁵ France cooperated in the East and intervened in the Japanese occupation in the Far East; i. e., thirty years after the Crimean War, they had already signed the Treaty of the Franco-Russian Alliance. Thus, the coalition of the Powers changes over time depending upon the international situation or the balance of interests among themselves. What follows, therefore, is that there are times when a single nation of ⁴⁰⁰ the closest interest and concern must, if not willingly, draw a sword on behalf of the world's interests. In the future, Japan, too, must play a responsible role for peace in the Far East. That Japan must be the security guard is a calling from Heaven, not my personal desire. Therefore, the terms of the peace treaty must put the first priority on preventing causes of future calamity in the East.

⁴⁰⁵ Whatever the outcome of this war, as it lasts longer, Japan's demands will grow bigger. Nevertheless, although there may be a few more wars sooner or later, Lüshun will fall; Vladivostok will fall, too; and there will be peace. If this is true, then we must first separate Russia from all of Manchuria to let them leave the area. And, [for Russia] to place a number of their warships at the port of Vladivostok in ⁴¹⁰ the future will be very dangerous in preserving the safety of the Sea of China and the Sea of Japan. Just as the Paris Conference prevented Russia from passing the Bosphorus Straits and suppressed their fleet in the Black Sea, so it is very dangerous [for Russia] to place their superior fleet in the Seas of China and of Japan. It is very dangerous, too, to keep Vladivostok in the hands of Russia. Thus, as a reward for ⁴¹⁵ our victory in this war, we should gain this military port [of Vladivostok], let Russia cede Janhaizhou, and gain Sakhalin. Siberia, over which it took Russia several centuries to set up a new system of management, is out of Japan's concern in terms of penetration, as long as it has nothing harmful to do with the future peace. If so, Japan should gain the East China Railway, needless to say. However, taking ⁴²⁰ control of the Siberian Railway, which leads to the East China Railway and to Vladivostok, is not in Japan's interest, and thus it should not be closed because it is the world's means of transportation. In turn, Russia should not close Siberia; rather, it should promote trade for mutual profits; and it should not impose extremely heavy taxation. It also is important to open its doors equally to the world the doors of

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this huge wasteland in Siberia that has infinite [potential] wealth. So is it important 425
[for Russia] not to prevent foreign entrepreneurs [from doing business there] by
establishing a variety of laws. This way, since the air of freedom naturally spreads,
the Siberian region will become really prosperous. Commerce will also prosper, and
the future Russo-Japanese relationship will certainly be a friendly one. This is the
most effective way to preserve the future Eastern peace. 430

Japan does not intend willingly to trouble other people for the sake of its national
dignity and victory. Now that we have determined to return to peace, we are hoping
that the politics of civilization will prevail in Russia and that the nation and its peo-
ple, the Slavic race, will prosper. This hope is mutually beneficial, and the mutual
benefit will be brought about by peace. The everlasting peace can be achieved only 435
when not only China but also Russia open their doors to the world and take in the
world civilization. This way, their transportation will prosper, and if the world com-
merce consequently prospers, then the power to guarantee peace will be increased.

And when this happens, the next question will be : How should the Japanese gov-
ernment treat Manchuria? This is the question concerning China, not Russia. This 440
Manchuria is a huge land, almost two and a half times as large as Japan. In addition,
it is a land with 3,000 years of history and with 2,000 years of relationship with Ja-
pan. But, on the other hand, its population is small and its economic development is
immature. The reason for this is because of its bad politics and structure. The horse
riding rebels [in the area] did not emerge recently but arose a long time ago, almost 445
when Chinese history began. Chinese history reveals that the Jiu tribe of northern
China became Cungnu after Zhouidi, and then through various changes became
Liau, Jin, and Yuan, and eventually Aiqinjuelwoshi emerged. So the power that
emerged in the northern part has always been oppressing, and frequently conquered
China. Although they did not conquer all of China, the activities of Cungnu were in- 450
deed surprising. Emperor Wu of Han was troubled by Cungnu, and even though
[Qui] Shihuang destroyed the six countries, he still had to order the construction of
the Great Wall in order to stop the Fan tribe, a kind of Cungnu. It was in those days
when the rebels, who liked fighting, emerged as a fairly strong power. The rode
their horses, and the way they acted was as devastating as burning a wilderness all 455
over. The horse riding fighters during the periods of Jin and Yuan terrified the sove-
reign and subjects of Song. Every time those people rode their horses and went to
the south, the Chinese forces were not able to cope with this aggression. When the
fight ended, they became either nomads or farmers. [But] suddenly, they again
rode their horses and became fighters. On their horses, they were warriors ; off 460
their horses, farmers. Since the dawn of Chinese history, those Northerners in Chi-
na always rode their horses to plunder and invade, and turned out to be Cungnu,
Keitan, Jin, and Yuan, so it is supposed. So, they have failed to develop a social or-

der. This is why civilization has not grown, nor has humanities. This is absolutely
465 because their politics have been bad. And, because the rulers have not had the skills
to rule the nation, it [China] has been put into confusion. And as an extreme result,
it is about to be plundered by Russia.

Thus, if we return it [i. e., Manchuria] to China now, will the Chinese govern-
ment be able to rule it? I doubt it. If it cannot be ruled, then the emerging confusion
470 will cause foreign nations to oppress and bring great and various disasters ; i. e., it
will harm the Eastern peace. Japan wants to return this [Manchuria] to China in a
friendly manner. And this return is the Grace of our Emperor of the greatest toler-
ance and goodness given to the Chinese Emperor. But by the same token, there
must be quite a few terms in deciding on this return to China. Not just Manchuria,
475 but China as a whole is so confused that its disaster may soon trouble its neighbor,
Japan. As long as Japan has the big responsibility to preserve peace in the Far East,
that responsibility forces us to do so much work of righteousness in order to preserve
peace. This is the background on which I advocated Japan's status in East Asia at
the outset. Although Japan has gained this land [Manchuria] at the sacrifice of thou-
480 sands of lives and at the expense of billions of money, we do not hesitate to return
this to China. But in so doing, China, let alone Manchuria, must promise that they
will keep a sufficient social order. Stated differently, until the Chinese Emperor ex-
ercises good politics and establishes a social order in China and until he promotes the
nation's civilization, assimilates the nation's systems and institutions with the world's
485 civilization, and becomes stable and independent enough to stand in the arena of
competition with the Powers, Japan needs to be the guardian of China in order to ful-
fill its responsibility to preserve peace in the Far East. Therefore, it is important for
the Chinese Emperor to lead the nation to civilization and prosperity, keeping in
mind this friendly, sincere heart of the Japanese Emperor and the Japanese people
490 even when he makes a round of inspection in his local magisterial areas. In this pro-
cess, it is Japan's duty to give friendly assistance as far as Japan's power can reach.
This is the hope of the whole Japanese people concerning the return of Manchuria.
And this will be the time when merchants of the Powers of the world will be able to
stay and start a business anywhere in China in safety. This will be the time when
495 the Powers of the world and the nations that once despised and troubled China will
themselves come to show great respect to the Chinese people. And peace will have
come when nobody has noticed it yet. Likewise, the dignity of China will. This is
what the Japanese people are hoping for the people of "*do-shu, do-bun*," the people
with 1,500 years of mutual relationship, the people of the same school of Confucius.
500 And the peace thus gained will eventually spread to the whole world.

I repeat : We of Japan do not intend to take advantage of victory in the war and to
look down on the weak. And this statement is not the kind to be declared to the Chi-

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nese government and the Chinese people only, but it should be regarded as one addressed to the world. As to the rights that the Western Powers have already gained in China and Korea, i. e., the Far East, and all the rights gained as nations or as individuals, Japan shall guarantee these carefully. I also believe that when the reconstruction of peace takes place and the world commerce prospers in our East, Japan shall not take a measure to guarantee some profits to one certain nation while blocking other profits. And, the Japanese people as a whole are hoping, under the free competition and under the interests of the [Western] Powers, to develop the Far Eastern civilization and to increase its wealth. It is indeed the hope of the Japanese people that international distrust, racial jealousy, and religious deception will significantly disappear; that this will promote the profits to be globally shared and will shed the light of peace on the people of the Far East as soon as possible; and that these will eventually come as a result of the triumph of our imperial forces. We, the Yamato tribe, believe that the accomplishment of this purpose is a task worthy of our lives, our calling from Heaven. (Big applause.)

NOTES TO THE OKUMA DOCTRINE

- * The present text of the Okuma Doctrine has been translated by Yoshihisa Sam Itaba, based on Shigenobu Okuma's "Toyo no heiwa o ronzu [Discussing Peace in the East]," transcribed in Waseda Daigaku Hensanbu (ed.), *Okuma haku enzetsu shu* [*Speeches of Marquis Okuma*] (Waseda UP, 1913), pp. 101-23. The translator is indebted to Professor Karlyn Kohrs Campbell of the University of Minnesota for giving numerous editorial suggestions.
- (1) The speech was delivered at Shinkan Kyokai (China-Korea Association) of Waseda University, whose audience was considered to be the students of Waseda, which Okuma founded. Since Waseda did not have a lot of students from China and Korea at that time, it is well assumed that the immediate audience must have consisted of mainly Japanese.
 - (2) That is, the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5).
 - (3) 安危荣辱.
 - (4) This is probably not a direct quotation from Confucius's *The Analects*; rather it may be a summary of one or more of his teachings. For instance, Book IV : 5 of *The Analects* reads in part : "The gentleman who ever parts company with Goodness does not fulfill that name. Never for a moment does a gentleman quit the way of Goodness." Or, Book IV : 6 reads in part : "Has anyone ever managed to do Good with his whole might even as long as the space of a single day? I think not. Yet I for my part have never seen anyone give up such an attempt because he had not the strength to go on. It may well have happened, but I for my part have never seen it." Confucius, *The Analects of Confucius*, Arthur Waley (trans.) (New York : Vintage, 1989).
 - (5) Count Vladimir Nikolaevich Lamsdorf (1841-1907).

- (6) This metaphor implies that one will be thrown into confusion if he teases China. The “hornet’s nest” metaphor was also used in the United States referring to the diplomacy of the Powers with China. For example, a hornet’s nest with a name “China” on it teased by such nations as England, France, Germany, Russia, the U. S., and Japan appeared in a political cartoon in *The Minneapolis Tribune* in 1901. See R. C. Bowman (collector), *The Minneapolis Tribune Cartoon Book for 1901* (Minneapolis : Tribune Printing Co., 1901), p. 58.
- (7) For instance, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was reached in 1902, which meant to the Japanese that their policy was understood and supported by the British. Germany also showed its understanding about Japan’s motives to fight this war. The United States remained neutral. It was only France that empathized with Russia.