

《論 說》

The Changing State Sovereignty in the Global System

Akiyoshi Hoshino

1. Introduction: The Changing State Sovereignty in the Global System

Where have state sovereignty gone? Every state itself can by no means answer the question with a definitive thinking and perspective about sovereignty. The reason is due to not only the ambiguous concept of sovereignty but also an ambivalent reality over sovereignty that there are two aspects in what sovereignty should be: on the one hand state sovereignty has increasingly gone down its position and function in the global system and has been required to restrict its existence; on the other hand it has been asked its establishment and has been made a great effort to maintain it. In spite of the fact, it is undeniable that from the standpoint of its nature, form, function, position, and meaning in the international system of state sovereignty has, to a great extent, been changing with the changing process of world (international) politics and vice versa. What is, first of all, to be emphasized is that state sovereignty must be considered not as a priori one, the prior existence, or the inherent right but as social construction.

World politics has extremely been transforming through the globalization of the international system. The inter-sovereign state relations as well as state sovereignty has been forcefully changing such that these position, function, and meaning in world politics have essentially reduced and weakened. In spite of this fact, the definition of sovereignty as “the internationalization of public authority within mutually elusive jurisdictional domains” is still prevailing over international relations¹⁾.

Certainly, it is arguable that most strong states partly remain primary entities seeking to shape, maintain, and develop political life in the international system:

- 1) sovereign states are all primary concerned with protecting their territorial integrity;
- 2) in the present society of states an equally basic concern is the preservation of political independence;
- 3) states are concerned about their economic integrity.

In short, the independent state and the society formed by such states continue to be a marked feature of global political organization which gives no indication of disappearing or even declining in the foreseeable future²⁾. But, this does not mean that the nature, identity, position, and function of state sovereignty have never changed in the real international system.

What is most essential is that we describe, theorize, and illustrate state sovereignty as “the practices that have socially constructed, reproduced, reconstructed, and deconstructed various sovereign ideals and resistances to them.” At the same time, must components of state sovereignty such as recognition, territory, population, authority, non-intervention, and so on be considered as ones socially constructed combined in specific historical international and national contexts³⁾.

Since Alan James as well as F. H. Hinsley recognize state sovereignty as constitutional interdependence or the independence of the state, as a

matter of course, they claim that sovereign states remain still a unique actor in international society⁴⁾. Such a review seems to be right if international society itself supporting fundamental stage of the existence of sovereign state can by no means change at all. However, international society always continues to transform into anyone new. While they have understood and dismissed permeability as constructing and erosion of sovereignty, "they do not discuss the more fundamental claim that the very basis of international society, its criterion of eligibility for membership, may be in process of modification"⁵⁾.

Without understanding state sovereignty as social construction, we not only can not approach its nature and function, but also may make us mistake them. At all events, what is ultimately at issue is that we have to grasp "the concept of sovereignty as a variable by exploring some of the circumstances under which the political legitimation of the nation-state changes over time." State sovereignty is by no means constant but varied⁶⁾. State sovereignty has been socially constructed, reconstructed, and transformed under the development process of world politics.

However, the state sovereignty concept has, in practice, been used as one of the most influential entities working international politics as normative, objective or symbol seeking for autonomy, independence, equality, and non-intervention, and as ideology able to legitimize its own behavior. For it is difficult to define state sovereignty, every state interprets and uses state sovereignty by its own favorite. And, since sovereignty as a key concept of international relation is connected with other by principles such as anarchy, state, authority, autonomy, territory, nation, non-intervention, power, domination, government, interdependence, institution, governance, and the like, the definition, meaning, and position in the international system of sovereignty itself may eventually affect the description, explanation, and forecast the changing reality of world politics. Still more, there is no doubt

at all that the concept of state sovereignty, as noticed above, must be deconstructed and reconstructed in the light of the changing global politics.

Admittedly, the Westphalian system as the modern international system was constructed by some sovereign states of Europe. With sovereignties these states could become entities of international politics, and could also constitute the limited international system among them. "For over three hundred years the international system has been characterized by several features which basically turn on the recognition of the centrality of the state and its sovereignty." Every state has been assumed to be sovereign and to be legally equal to one another as the unique political actor externally. Every state has been thought to be the political actor with autonomy, independence of the international system and supreme authority within domestic territorial space⁷⁾. States, through their own sovereignties even legally and formally, at the fixed scale, preserved autonomy, equality, independence, territory, authority, non-intervention meaning the essential qualification as the unique sovereign entity in the international system. To put it differently, every sovereign state⁸⁾, equally and interdependently, could participate in the process of decision-making over international value-allocation, and could, at varying degrees, decide value-allocation even without supreme authoritative governing entity beyond these sovereign states. The Westphalian system were, with no doubt, established on such principles.

Nevertheless, the state sovereignty principle, in practice, involved some inherent contradictions in real development of the international system. Daniel Philpott claims that norms of sovereignty must answer three questions, namely the three faces of sovereignty: 1) who are the legitimate politics? international politics? States? the European Union?; 2) who is entitled to become one? monarchy? nations? colonies?; 3) what essential

prerogatives in making and enforcing decision do the legitimate polities enjoy? Although Daniel Philpott suggests three important questions, we want to represent questions from the different standpoints in order to illuminate sovereignty's problems in the globalized system in particular⁹⁾.

First, as suggested above, state sovereignty can by no means be a priori identity or the prior existence but the social construction. The problem lies in the point that every state itself has inherently sovereignty, but has sovereignty constructed in the relationship among states and between state and domestic social factors. Every state can automatically have the political right capable of deciding equally international value-allocation. Clearly, sovereignty is not same one as decision-making power (capability)¹⁰⁾. Since sovereignty seems to be equal among states, "The modern principle of state sovereignty has emerged historically as the legal expression of the character and legitimacy of the state. Most fundamentally it expresses the claim by states to exercise legitimate power within strictly delimited territorial boundaries¹¹⁾."

In the light of the fact that in the international system state sovereignty functioned as a ground of self-claim of right, and a state could not, one-sidedly, neglect other ones, sovereignty was certainly recognized as a reality. State sovereignty seems to be considered as a basic rule, at the time of constituting the relationship among nations capable of identifying a political entity and of joining the international system. What has to be noticed is what significance sovereignty has when sovereign states become possible to survive and behave in the international system¹²⁾. Sovereignty itself cannot automatically make a state, but the state itself constructs sovereignty in the relationship among other nations. For sovereignty can never possess absolute authority, it cannot essentially avoid to conflict with international society. According to Joseph Frankel, "External sovereignty implies a basic contradiction of any notion of international order. As

international society of full sovereign states injust as unthinkable as a domestic anarchist society of full sovereign individuals... That contradiction shows most clearly in the relation between the institutions of the sovereign state and international law¹³⁾."

What is more, if state sovereignty is assumed to be absolute authority or a priori power, the anarchical international system may be naturally brought about. As realists put it, in the anarchical system a sovereign unavoidably run against one another owing to the incompatibility between sovereigns, resulting for states in leading to the eternal struggle for power. This means the self-destruction of sovereignty and negation of a sovereign entity.

Second, we must point to the problem that there are fundamentally extreme inequalities, at varying levels, qualitatively or quantitatively, among state sovereignties. While every sovereignty is likely to be legally equal, every state, in fact, has different decision-making authority. There is the asymmetrical quality among sovereign states as for allocations in terms of power, military force, values, population, territory, public opinion, technical capability, economic development, and the like. States have different capabilities able to claim, make develop their own sovereignties, namely various power capable realizing, maintaining, and enlarging their own interests and values in the international system.

Generally speaking, despite the fact that there is no authoritative governing entity restraining all states' behaviors and relations among states, they also are by no means completely autonomous sovereign entities. A state can influence other states, but the former is, no doubt, affected by the latter. Insofar as the strong can set up selfish actions against the weak, international relations can, as the result, depend on the power of states. The formation, development and transformation process of the international system has, in reality, meant international relations among great powers rather than ones among unequal powers. Every sovereign state cannot

possess the same decision-making powers. No wonder that there is a general tendency to classify sovereign states into superpowers, great powers, middle powers, small powers, and micro powers by the standard of capability able to control behaviors modes of other states¹⁴⁾. The degree and content of autonomy and authoritative force of sovereignty depend, to a great extent, on the domestic conditions of states and the mode of inter-state relations.

Third, another problem focuses on the dichotomy of internal sovereignty and external sovereignty. Can two aspects of sovereignty be made a distinction? Should we distinguish external sovereignty from internal one? It is impossible and unnecessary to claim the domestic-international dichotomy of sovereignty and to maintain the discontinuity of domestic-international dimension of sovereignty. Because the domestic political system and the international system have an overlapping subsystem or linkage system between both systems meaning to influence on each other, resulting in losing a defined boundary between two systems. Essentially, sovereignty is constructed by domestic social context and international context among states. External sovereignty invariably affects domestic sovereignty and vice versa. Both aspects of sovereignty intrinsically are closely linked each other in greater or less degree. This implies that in order to explain international politics, the relationship between state and society must be illustrated in more detail. In case that sovereign states seek for getting their values and interests, they not only must, to a great extent, be affected by domestic society, but also must positively expect domestic consent and support. "A state recruits sections of domestic society for the international activities. At the same time, both the state and society seek to gain support from their internal conflict for international sources¹⁵⁾." The degree and quality of autonomy of state sovereignty ultimately rely on the pressures from the domestic system and the international system alike.

Fourth, we must find out the problem of whose state sovereignty. On considering state sovereignty, we must direct attention to the fact that the state is by no means an integrated and rational entity. While the foreign policy and external behavior of a state superficially appear to be an integrated pattern, they are, in reality, the production from interactions among various substate actors, non-state actors, and people including government. For whom is eventually autonomy of state? Generally speaking, every state has people, nation, or diverse ethnicities. Nation-states are the historical production, and the states formulation emerged from a certain historical context¹⁶⁾. Modern European states meant to be power as its control foundation, connected with sovereignty, combined to nation (community) by the French Revolution. Originally, states as power organization and nations as community are different conceptions. Consequently, even absolute monarchical states and nation-states, definitely, having a common quality as the framework of states, possessed each other different international strengths. Not surprisingly, the modern state system, in fact, meant king-king relations fundamentally different from the international system of nation-states. To date, Euro-centric states system as the system of nation-states has remarkably globalized with a worldwide scale. Since the post-World War II many colonies of the periphery got their independences, resulting in aiming at becoming nation-states. But what deserved to be pointed out is that most of these states are actually multinational ones. It is true of other states including European states and socialist states. There are few one-nation states. Most nation-states, more or less, include some ethnic groups. This tendency is true of the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia¹⁷⁾. Is state sovereignty ultimately autonomous authority for rules, government as political organization, nation, people, or ethnicity? The subject of state sovereignty is too ambiguous to recognize properly 'whose state sovereignty'.

These problems have, more and more, been sharpened through the development of globalized system. At the same time, the quality and content of state sovereignty have increasingly been changing, and then transforming its position and significance on world politics. It is arguable that the international system is, in fact, not self-efficient, and that non-state or entities appear as indispensable components of the global system. Unquestionably, there are various phenomena unable to accord with analytical framework of the former sovereign state system. Every state, regardless of its power, has, to a great extent, weakened its sovereignty such as autonomy, authoritative force (decision-making power), independence, hard territoriality, supreme governing power, non-intervention, and the like. "Sovereignty is disintegrating. States are less able to perform their traditional functions. Global factors increasingly impinge on all decisions made by governments. Identity patterns are becoming more complex, as people assert local loyalties but want to share in global values and life styles. The traditional distinction, namely foreign and domestic policies is less tenable than ever. And there is growing awareness that we are sharing a common world history¹⁸⁾."

It follows that sovereign state has lowered the position of the strongest and most effective political entity as decision-making actor over international value-allocation. Admittedly, political identity of sovereign state is trembling under the globalization of the international system. Since sovereign state can exclusively no more decide value-allocation in the global system, the sovereign state-centric decision-making mechanism is losing its monopolized efficiency.

It is the former principle of sovereignty that can never solve global (planetary) problems such as human rights, the planetary environment, development and inequality, peace and order produced through the development process of the globalization of world. Regardless of the living

place of world, "the inhabitants of the planet experience a set of common problems that can be exacerbated by the actions of an individual nation-state. This development represents, at the minimum, a 'nationalization' of global issues, an expectation that national policies must address the common problems of the planet¹⁹⁾." In an increasingly globalized system, the principle of sovereignty is less and less feasible. Less wonder that the condition can lead various non-state actor without sovereignty to participating in decision-making process over global value-allocation, and to playing an important role. In this sense, state sovereignty is challenged by non-state actors or transnational actors in the global system.

However, we must, at the same time, recognize that state sovereignty has never completely faded away in the global system, and that states remained the primary entity for decision-making and political identity in the globalized system. It is undeniable that a state is the most dominant unit capable of deciding global value-allocation in comparison with other non-state actor. The global system has so far seemed to be mainly composed of interactions among states with their value-allocation's capability. The contemporary global system is, in effect, composed of multilevel interacting actors, and their actors constitute multilevel interactions over value-allocation for the global society. To put it differently, there are multilateral energies; localism, subnationalism, nationalism regionalism, globalism in the worldwide system. Every actor from individual to global organization has, more or less, a certain energy seeking to allocate values of the global system²⁰⁾. Sovereign states are also one of these actors. Accordingly, in the light of such a condition, the nature of state sovereignty must be given, and the position and meaning on the globalized world politics should be sought for.

Well, can we grasp the nature of state sovereignty in the changing global system? According to Hans-Hentik Holm and George Sørensen, there

are three different dimensions of sovereignty: negative sovereignty is the juridical or formal aspect of sovereign statehood; positive sovereignty describes a state that is own master. Sovereignty has the capabilities to supply substantial goods to its people; operational sovereignty suggests a situation where states choose to limit their legal freedom of action in the process of bargaining with other states. That is to say, states put constraints on themselves²¹⁾. And, from the standpoint of quasi-state, Robert Jackson tries to divide state sovereignty into positive sovereignty and negative one. While the former implies the means by which state enjoys independence, the latter implies freedom from external interaction²²⁾. However, it is arguable that every state can nowadays be considered as semi-sovereign state or quasi-sovereign state, in the sense in which every state has no longer complete autonomous governing authority able to provide citizens with security, economic well-beings, and domestic governance²³⁾.

The aim of this article is to investigate the changing nature of state sovereignty in the development process of the global system, its significance and position in globalized world politics, and the orientation of state sovereignty in the future. Consequently, second, by investigating the dichotomized sovereignty, namely internal one and external one, we shall extract the problems immanent in territorial state sovereignty. Third, from the standpoint of state sovereignty as social construction, we try to describe a new framework capable of grasping properly the nature of state sovereignty. Fourth, it is necessary to examine the change of state sovereignty in the process of globalization of the international system. Fifth, we want to analyze the nature and position of state sovereignty in the globalized world politics, and to consider what future state sovereignty should be.

2. Two Dimensions of State Sovereignty

In order to illuminate the changing nature and meaning of state sovereignty in the globalized system, we must, first of all, explain the nature and meaning of two dimensions of traditional sovereignty (internal and external), and the relationship between both dimensions, what is more, the problems concerned. As Figure 1 suggests, modern state sovereignty started with two faces, namely internal (inside) sovereignty and external (outside) sovereignty. Sovereign states were assumed to be externally autonomous, independent entities and to be internally supreme authority within their own territorial space. Although the former can be considered as historical or negative sovereignty in the sense that there is no supreme authority able to govern its own entity beyond it, the latter can be called as vertical or positive sovereignty from the standpoint of conditions that there is by no means political entity with same supreme authority as itself within a certain political space. While multiple sovereignties construct the international system, a unique sovereignty constitutes the domestic system.

In the first place, state sovereignty with two faces was due to historical backgrounds. For modern states to realize as sovereign political entities, they had not only to establish autonomy and independence for external pressures such as Roman Church and Roman Empire, but also to constrain internal pressures of feudal forces and to control these forces (within a certain political space). State sovereignty was political substance, symbol, and normative objective to make it possible to realize such an objective and to legitimize state's behavior. As said already, what is the most clear from the condition is that state sovereignty is not a priori one or the prior existence, but is essentially social construction both internally and externally brought about in terms of social relationships among political entities as well as within these political entities

However, once state sovereignty was, in practice, constructed in the domestic political system and in the international system alike, sovereignty had a tendency to be considered as a priori one, resulting in leaving all the other political relations far behind. The concept of state sovereignty neglected the real political subjects, it seems to play a role as an important symbol meaning supreme governing authority beyond all other political entities internally and externally. In the meanwhile, the matter of important significance is that there is the defined denunciation between internal sovereignty and external sovereignty. Inside/outside of political space might lead political life to divide between the domestic system and the international system. That is to say, there are two different political identities of political life having hard borderline between both.

Internal sovereignty of modern states has assumed to be supreme authority or superior dominant power over all political forces and people within the domestic political space. Modern states, in fact, meant governing organization with supreme. All people and political forces under territorial jurisdiction became objects of sovereignty. Regardless of the issues of for whom sovereignty and whose ultimately, state became a real sovereign in the sense in which state possessed and enforced its sovereignty, namely supreme governing power over the ruled within domestic political society. Consequently, state sovereignty essentially implied the vertical relationship of power. Of course, although state power, to an great extent, held the ruled's consent or support, states were the executions of the legitimized power. There is no doubt at all that even if a sovereign state had and maintained supreme governing power within judicial political space, it could by no means possess and execute formally its power without its space. On the contrary, the state cannot easily permit the enforcement of supreme power of other states towards its own state.

But, state sovereignty as centring of authority within a given political

space can lead to emphasize on other things. "In this context, concern with sovereignty occurs in three primary forms: as a given, as the outer limit of a society, a limited occurring as geographical frontier and maintained by procedures of defence and diplomacy; as a technical, legal problem, especially in the construction of constitutional and institutional politics; and as a concept always in uneasy notion between power and authority, and thus between state and civil society or state and nation²⁴⁾."

Here we must again call attention to state sovereignty as non-prior existence and social construction within the territorial space. While the outward face of state sovereignty, on the whole, seems to be supreme governing authority, its face, in practice, has an ambiguous complex content: type and meaning of governance, the member of sovereign, the structure of the relationship to people or nation, the relationship between power and authority. State sovereignty is composed of various factors, and depends on them. That is to say, the real content of sovereignty is likely to be closely connected with what state should be. In case of monarchical state, even if there were the contradictions of governing type and content as well, it is possible for these contradictions to be resolved. The tension between power and authority, and sovereign state and sovereign people or nation have come to be resolved either through binary distinction between state and civil society or through unitarity claims to national identity. Nation could partly contribute to give birth to and enhance identity-consciousness between the ruler and the ruled²⁵⁾. But in case of nation-state, contradictions between the ruler and nation, one nation and other nation, nation and ethnic groups, and then greater tensions between both bring about conflict over the legitimacy of supreme governing authority. These tensions themselves are linked together tensions between power as coercive dominance and authority as legitimized power. The problem of for whom sovereignty, whose sovereignty, and ultimately what sovereignty cannot be

avoided to be fully answered in case of illustrating the concept of the nature and meaning of state sovereignty in the domestic political space.

Figure 1 Traditional Dichotomy of state Sovereignty





Figure 2 Sovereignty as social construction



It is the problem of democracy who is supreme decision-maker in the domestic value-allocation process. It is worth noting that democratic state, authoritative state, dictatorship, capitalist state, socialist state, military state, multinational state, and the like have, at varying degrees, different characteristics of state sovereignties. Even on discussing liberal democracy, the conception of sovereignty of nation-state has been considered as a nature of course, and it has gradually not been questioned. "It has been assumed that the state has control over its own fate, subject only to compromises it must make and limit imposed upon it by actors, agencies and forces separating within its territorial boundaries²⁶⁾." However, the

presence of positive states or administrative states also have shaded off the different nature of state sovereignty with the increasing strength of the state menace in terms of the state's capability to coerce civil society. From the standpoint of international relations, it is not easy to define ultimate source of sovereign authority legitimized to speak for its particular domestic society in international relations. "The source of sovereign authority has changed historically." For example, the absolute monarch for the Concert of Europe, the people for the Allied Powers and the Wilson Administration²⁷⁾.

Another problem can be discounted over where, what political space which state sovereignty has to do with. In other words, where can state sovereignty have supreme governing authority over domestic political space, namely territorial space? State sovereignty generally has so far given full play to supreme governing authority with judicial borderline. Supreme decision-making power is almost compatible with the economic, social, cultural, and political spaces. People have become not only the subjects of sovereign states but also subjects to forces that are beyond the control of state authority. While state sovereignty can have supreme decision-making power over domestic society, it is gradually affected its power by issues and forces of larger space beyond territorial border. Even supreme governing authority control these problems and forces. It can never avoid the influence of decision-making power over global value-allocation from external space. The infringement of human rights, ecological pollution, the North-South problem, technological development, the growth of population, poverty, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, AIDS, refugee movements, starvation, ethnic conflicts, and the like all become uncontrollable larger scale problems by territorial space-centric governing authority. On the contrary, states hold no longer full governing power over various issues and conflicts within territorial space, resulting in releasing these issues into the global system. The political space where state sovereignty can cover the effective

governing power have increasingly reduced its scope, and, at the same time, territorial borderline has continuously weakened under the increased globalization of the international system.

How about external dimension of sovereignty? The external sovereignty of modern state has been thought to be autonomous power and independent authority. Sovereign states have been autonomous entities and formally equal to each other. Sovereign states have had no authoritative governing entities beyond states. They have been autonomous entities externally and supreme authority within their territorial jurisdiction. And every sovereign state could not govern domestic decision-making process over social value-allocation. The principle of non-intervention shows the right not constrained its behaviors and interestes by external pressures. Its principle also meant to be unique sovereign in the international relations from standpoint of the international system. Sovereign states naturally were actors in the international system without a centralized authority, namely in the international anarchy. At the same time, sovereign states had no political space similar to territorial jurisdiction or domestic community. So, the international system is defined both by the presence of sovereign states as primary actors and the absence of a sovereign war/authority governing the system itself²⁸⁾.

International relations mean to be the relationship among state sovereignties, supreme governing authorities within domestic political space. Although the internal sovereignty of state can be considered as the vertical relations among supreme governing authorities as non-sovereignties, the external sovereignty can be interpreted as horizontal relations between supreme powers. Every state sovereignty has equally autonomous power, and it become absolute entity in the international system without higher supreme power. However, in practice, external sovereignty is also not the prior existence, but is social construction brought about by international

relations. Sovereign state can by no means possess and maintain automatically supreme governing authority in the international system. Insofar as there is no relationship among sovereign states, there will be no external sovereignty of state.

However, it is easy for sovereign state to be recognized as state as the master of sovereignty in international relations. Because the external sovereignty itself, regardless of the nature and structure of sovereign state, can make state the subject of the international system. Since state is simply an external organization of sovereignty in international relations, state can externally be considered as the subject of sovereignty. It does not matter that who can internally become real sovereign. Regardless of the nature and content or state sovereignty and of different types of governing structure in the domestic political system (relations), sovereign state is always and necessarily found in international relations. To put it differently, sovereign state can inherently become supreme decision-making power over international value-allocation. Accordingly, sovereign state externally is supreme power organization as billiard ball with black-box²⁹⁾.

Nevertheless, while sovereign state can certainly become the external subject, the nature and structure of internal sovereignty, in fact, give birth to different international relations. Every state by no means takes a same action each other. Since the external sovereignty is closely connected with the internal sovereignty, it is impossible and unnecessary to divide between outward face and inward face. Such a view directs us to the principle of equal autonomous governing power among states. This principle is by no means realistic. For "The multistate system is markedly by enormous disparities is not to describe but the function of the principle of equality is not to describe but to change reality; it is a normative statement, intended to regulate that unequals be treated as if they were equals, and thereby to diminish their inequality³⁰⁾." The real significance of the equality of status

cannot suggest "that they are equal in other regards whether of legal rights, diplomatic standing, economic well being, military clout, or whatever³¹⁾."

Can sovereign state effectively behave with autonomou power? Can it seek freely for state's interest and value in international relations? Since the international system has no supreme governing power equal to internal sovereignty, sovereign state is assumed to have equal autonomous power one another capable of wanting freely. In international relations among sovereignties, its supreme autonomous power cannot avoid to consider the nature and structure of international relations themselves. For to claim its own autonomous power, state not only must recognize other sovereignties but also must be recognized by other sovereignties. To construct, maintain, and develop international relations, the self-control of state sovereignty may partly work on through power itself or justice, norms, freedom, common consciousness, namely the international system continue, maintain, and develop its existence. Autonomous sovereign power is compatible with the requirements of participation in the state-system. Even without overarching governing power in the international system, such mechanism can maintain and support the international system as well as a certain autonomou sovereignty of state.

Well, realistically speaking, every state sovereignty has by no means same size, same function, and same power. Sovereign states by no means enforce same autonomous governing power in the international system. Despite the fact, the international system is not necessarily anarchical, and there is a certain, but incomplete, overarching governing mechanism without a supreme authority. What is to be emphasized is that with the development of globalization of the international system, the global expansion of poltical space and identity and the depth of international relations lead to weakness of supreme decison-making power of every sovereign state, and to

self-restraint of autonomous decision-making power. In short, as Figure 2 shows, because sovereignty is not a priori supreme power, but social construction, the nature and structure of state sovereignty has transformed its meaning and function. Moreover, it is impossible and insignificant to distinguish state sovereignty between internal sovereignty and external sovereignty. So, as the most essential point in case of considering the nature and meaning of state sovereignty, we must investigate the nature and structure of sovereignty as social construction.

3. State Sovereignty as International Social Construction

On discussing the nature and structure of state sovereignty as well as the position and meaning in world politics, what is the most important is that we must recognize state sovereignty as social construction. Without such an understanding of sovereignty, we can by no means not only grasp properly the nature, principle, and dynamics of contemporary world politics, but also seek for adequately the way and means to resolve and conquest the global conflict and crisis structure of world politics. Well, what does concretely state sovereignty as social construction mean? Why should we comprehend state sovereignty as the international relations? Here we try to investigate the construction process and structure of external sovereignty in particular.

Through assuming state sovereignty as a priori one, as conflicting relations among supreme governing powers having no global supreme authority organization, what world politics can be described? The concept of sovereignty as the prior existence has essentially a tendency to be connected with one of anarchy. "To say that a state is sovereign means that it decides for itself how it will cope with its internal and external problems³²⁾." States can become unique sovereignty in the international system without supreme governing authority. No wonder that the

anarchical international system may easily be legitimized. In the anarchical system, states are supreme governing power entities, and hence cannot be dominated and restricted their power, interest, and behavior by another political entity. International relations among states is equal to inter-sovereign relations. No political entity govern, manage, control, resolve the relations among supreme powers. Sovereign states, through not abandoning, reducing, coordinating, and arranging their sovereignty, but maintaining and strengthening it, one way or another, try to get, pursue, and enlarge their power, interest, identity, and supreme governing power itself.

Since there is no authoritative governing entity in the international system, anarchy demand sovereign states the system of self-help. In the anarchical system every state cannot avoid to take self-help action or relative interest behavior. If a state takes other-help action or relative gains-oriented action, it is self-evident that the state does not fail to destroy itself. As long as every state cannot guarantee its own survival and interest in terms of its own power without the expectation of other-help, it automatically choose not only to depend on its own power, but also not to help other states or take altruistic actions. Since every state behaves similarly, the logic of self-help is gradually institutionalized. The system of self-help as an institution may continue to exist over time without a change. For there is no state or no force capable of self-transforming positively. Every state can by no means expect other help as long as there is no authoritative governing entity able to help to preserve one's own survival and interest.

Insofar as the international system is equal to inter-sovereignty relations among states, the unique mechanism capable of maintaining the international system is only balance of power system meaning the check and balance among sovereign powers.

While we can certainly understand international relations as the

anarchical system from the standpoint of non-existence of global governing entity (world state or world government), its condition itself cannot automatically lead to legitimatizing the existence of the anarchical international system in terms of supreme governing power beyond supreme power of states. A governing entity (government) is defined as a concrete entity with supreme authority in a certain political space, namely the authoritative entity of decision-making over social value-allocation within its political space. Admittedly, there is no government within international political space. Unlike in the domestic system, in the international system there is not any legitimate governing entity consented and supported by sovereign states. In other words, the international system has no governing entity able to control or govern legally actors' behaviors. But, even without legitimized governing entity as government, there are a lot of sub-governing entities, which have less supreme governing power, such as various international regimes, international opinions and movements, religious and political authority, international law, inter-governmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations, and the like. These sub-governing powers, at varying scales, play increasingly a role making it possible to establish and carry out the rules of states' behaviors mode, to control and arrange conflicting states' actions, and to cooperate mutually to get common values. We must develop the thinking of a governmental order. The significant event of past 100 years has been the development of non-governmental organizations³³⁾. Anarchy as lack of government does not mean lack of legitimized executive a-coercion as well as authority themselves, but lack of legitimized carrying out coercion as well as authoritative entity.

Realist theory describing the international system as anarchical situation without an authoritative government is not adequate and realistic. It underlines the rules restraining other's behaviors by the degree of size of power and coercive power without legitimized inter-sovereignty relations.

Power will, a great extent, tell in relationship between sovereign states under no authoritative governing power. Since there is no supreme governing entity capable of controlling international relations, inter-sovereign state relations are constrained by the structure of power-distribution in the international system. Every state has no means besides behaving according to a certain type such as hegemonic structure, bipolar structure, multipolar structure, balance of power structure, polyarchic structure. Since power-distribution structures are, in practice, constructed by sovereign states with a certain, great powers, namely inter-great powers relations themselves may, as a result, constrain other's behaviors. Great powers establish the international system for their own interests and set up or carry out rules controlling other's behaviors. These rules is not for all actors or the system itself, but for great powers aiming to maintain their dominant position. The logic of modern states system has generated not only wars among states but also the dominance of the weak states by the strong states³⁴⁾.

The logic that state sovereignty as a priori one, supreme governing authority can lead international relations among states to the anarchical system is true of anarchy as disorder. Disorder means the conflicting situation among state sovereignties, namely among supreme governing orders. It is undeniable that as long as every decision-making entity with supreme power self-claim and do not restrain itself, Hobbes' *homo homini lupus est* situation develop, and the state of war unavoidably may continue. Insofar as there is no single or integrated entity able to decide global value-allocation in the international system. Conflicts over global value-allocation will be to be structured. The asymmetrical structure of international values and interests themselves is a primary cause bringing about disorder of the international system.

Is there any order as resolute decision-making mechanism over

international value-allocation. Is it possible for such a mechanism to constrain, control, manage, govern even partly and incompletely state sovereignty? As mentioned already, when there is no behavior-rule of decision-making entities in international relations among states, the system is to have no order. However, in reality, far from it, the system itself can come into existence. Because minimum behavior-rule may support the existence of system. Although the international system is potentially endowed with the condition of disorder, its system almost continue to seek for a certain order. Sovereign states must self-control and self-govern its supreme decision-making power in order to maintain its governing power. Lack of supreme authoritative governing entity beyond state sovereignty in the international system cannot become necessarily disorder³⁵⁾. The international system is supported and preserved by social factors, namely regulated decision-making mechanism constraining the behaviors of sovereign states. There is social factor meaning a society of states (sophisticated international society), when a group of states are conscious of a certain common interest or value through thinking that themselves are constrained the common rule in making mutually the relations among states, and they constitute society in the sense in which they own jointly their institutions³⁶⁾. Generally speaking, it is arguable that there are minimum some behavior rules of states essential to maintain its system, and that these rules are, more and more, established and are strengthened. It is these factors shaping, maintaining, developing, and transforming that can suggest us that state sovereignty is not the prior existence but variable existence because of a socially construction. In a sense, we can call governance the effective rule of sovereignty. " 'Governance' points to the systematic understatement of effective rule, of authority relations at the international level where the concept of sovereignty in a system of self-help might not meaningfully matter any more³⁷⁾."

State sovereignty has established not only anarchical system but also social system. The inter-sovereign state system, in part, means common interest and value, common rule and institution, and common customs as well as influence interaction and intersection among sovereign states³⁸⁾.

The international system contains regulative decision-making mechanism derived from normative, cooperative interactions socially integrated by fundamental intersubjective consent regarding norm, value, and objective. In other words, the behaviors based on sovereignty can partly be constrained and partly governed by common rules established among decision-making entities. The ruled principles are international institutions, international law, international customs, balance of power, diplomacy, the rule of non-intervention, the role of great powers, international regimes. According to realist, since the international system can by no means have intrinsically the effective rule capable of restricting and managing states' behaviors, the factor to deter their behaviors is only based on self-willing of states themselves. For realists, international law, morality, ethics, international institutions cannot contribute to deterring these behaviors, but they can function as the means for enlarging power, and the element(component) of the struggle for power. Such thinking is based on the dichotomy of international political system and domestic political system. While the former is assumed to be disorder's world, the latter is thought to be order's world. This dualism itself introduces to the dichotomy of external sovereignty and internal sovereignty. Both notions definitely may fail to recognize that sovereignty is a complex identity of international sovereignty as well as domestic sovereignty, resulting in becoming flexible one.

We made a conclusion that since state sovereignty is not the prior existence, but social construction, it is changable, that it is different and wrong to divide between internal sovereignty and external one, and that it is controled and managed by institutional regulated decision-making

mechanisms. But we have so far not discussed in more detail why for sovereignty to be controlled and governed by such mechanisms. So we must investigate the structure making it possible to control, manage, and govern sovereignty as supreme autonomous governing power.

It is natural that while the nature and characteristics of the decision-makers as well as the decision-making process of sovereign states partly construct state identity and interest, restrict state behavior, the most influential force may be derived from systemic structure of the international system. For the structural pattern of relations among states itself may, to the great degree, construct the nature, identity, interest of sovereignty and may constrain the nature of sovereignty. As the systemic structure of relations is profoundly developed, state sovereignty are, more and more, constrained by its systemic one.

It is the forces of systemic structure in the inter-sovereign state system that suggest the nature and characteristic of sovereignty as social construction. On considering the position and significance of sovereignty, in particular contemporary one in world politics, we must recognize the importance of the social forces of systemic structures. Consequently, what is ultimately at issue is the nature, function, and original process of the systemic structure. To illustrate these issues almost amounts to make clear the nature, function, and original process of world order. Because world order also may ultimately be regulative decision-making mechanism constructing sovereignty identity and interest as well as restricting state's behavior. But here the essential issue is to question the fundamental structure among state sovereignty shaping, maintaining, and developing world order as regulative decision-making mechanism over global value-allocation. We don't want to take about world order itself.


Alexander Wendt and Daniel Fiedhein, through not only stressing on the shared ideas or common knowledge embodied in intersubjective phenomena

like institutions and threat systems(the basis of the international system is a shared knowledge structure), but also the properties of state agents—their identities, interests, and capabilities—constructed by or endogenous to system structures rather than intrinsic to their nature, suggest four kinds of systemic structures. From the standpoint of (1) states are constructed by system? and (2) system structure is social?, they represent dependency theory, neorealism, neoliberalism, constitutionalism. Dependency theory outlines that material structures of economic exchange dominates the international system of inherent asymmetrical relations. Neorealism emphasizes the distribution of capabilities(anarchic structure). Neoliberalism focuses on the structure of regimes(institutions) with individualist, rationalist view of agency. Constitutionalism pays attention to intersubjective structure, namely a shared knowledge structure. “They share two basic propositions: that the identities and interests of state actors are in important part constructed by structures in the international system, and that these structures are social rather than material. These two claims are the core of a social constitution approach to international theory³⁹⁾.” (See Table 1).

Table 1 Four structures

material structure	intersubjective structure
capability (power) structure	institutional structure

Figure 3 Interacting structures



There is no doubt at all that the structures in the international system can in important part constrain the nature, identities, and interests of sovereign states, and that these structures are social rather than material.

However, we must recognize that these structures establish the interactions and mutual influence among them, and that a complex of structures might concretely construct the nature, identities, and interests of state sovereignty. Moreover, the pattern of a complex of structures might, at the same time, constrain states' behavior. States are *not* a priori other-regarding entity neither a priori self-regarding entity. Both are socially constructed. As Figure 3 suggests, we can find out interacting structures. It is doubtful that "Although states can pursue cooperative or confrontational policies, they cannot escape from a self-help system⁴⁰⁾." Accordingly, on thinking these assumptions in the light of state sovereignty, the nature, identity, and interest of sovereignty might be always changing because of its social construction, these changes depend on the pattern of a complex of structures. If a core of system structures will be social rather than material, supreme governing power of decision-making over global value-allocation will be constrained and gone down its authority and vice versa. As great powers-centric system puts it, when systemic structures are material rather than social, state sovereignty may remain strong, unchangable, and unrestricted. In consequence, regime structure and intersubjective in particular may become fundamental, strong, primary within a complex of systemic structures, while state sovereignty may weaken, resulting in governing and managing states' actions.

We underlined that the anarchical system is the one of self-help or the one of self-regarding. Every state is obliged to take self-regarding actions in the anarchical system without the global authoritative entity. But, even if there is no authoritative governing entity, sovereign states can become self-regarding, and can take other-helping actions in terms of the intersubjective structure in the international system. Nowadays we partly find out the system of other-help, and even on the whole can discover various other-regarding behaviors without an authoritative controlling actor.

It is difficult for many states to preserve their own security by means of self-regarding behaviors, and it is important to establish a cooperative security system with other states. "The security of each is perceived as the responsibility of all⁴¹⁾." States have, in practice, a lot of opportunities to adequate behaviors within the institutionalized framework of intersubjective structure. What is the most essential for the discussion is that "The rules of sovereignty vary, and thus the concept is neither fixed nor constant⁴²⁾."


Their structures are nearly equated with social forces of Robert W. Cox. He considers social forces as the framework for actions of individuals, groups, or historical structures. Social forces impose a certain pressure and constrain not only behaviors of individuals or groups but also interactions among individuals or groups. Social relations develop on the basis of a process of formation, magnification, and transformation of social forces. Social forces are composed of material capabilities, ideas, and institutions, and these factors interact in a structure. Material capabilities having productive and destructive potentials, exist as technological and organizational capabilities. Ideas consist of intersubjective meanings, of notions of the nature of social relations, and of collective image of social order held by different groups of people. "Institution is a means of stabilizing and perpetuating a particular order. Institutions reflect the power relations prevailing at their point of origin and tend, at least initially, to encourage collective images consistent with these power relations. Eventually, institutions take on their own life." And such social forces shape, maintain, develop, and transform world (international) order and forms of state, and constrain the nature of world order, moreover influence the forms of state⁴³⁾.

Here we can describe the relationship among a complex of systemic structures, inter-sovereign state relations, and state sovereignty as follows.

In consequence, we must question how the nature, identity, and interest

of state sovereignty as well as ones of inter-sovereign state relations have transformed through the process of globalization of its system. That is to say, how may state sovereignty be constructed in the global system? What about inter-sovereign state relations?

Figure 4



significance towards state sovereignties, rather globalization movement is, in fact, extending in various states and regions. It is arguable that the nature, identity, interest of state sovereignty are, more or less, different. But what is ultimately at issue is that on the whole the globalization has fundamentally brought about a large and important change of all state sovereignties what should be as well as what inter-sovereign states relations should be.

What are, on earth, these changes? Generally speaking, supreme governing power, namely supreme autonomous decision-making power over global value-allocation has greatly been lost, weakened, gone down, and reduced by the globalization of world. And then, the nature and significance of some attributes of state sovereignty such as autonomy, non-intervention, territory, mutual recognition of sovereignty, people, nation have also been changing conspicuously, resulting for these function and meaning in being weakened, gone down, reduced by the globalization. First of all, the increasing interdependence among sovereign states can enlarge the space of decision-making over global value-allocation to the global space beyond state territory. Since every state makes closed political, economic, cultural, and technological network with other states, every state, even great powers, cannot neglect and make light of the complex network of relation channels, and must decide value-allocation within its network. Insofar as every state does not participate in a global network of value-allocation, it can no more preserve fully its political, economic, cultural life, resulting in losing or reducing their values, identity, and interest. Because states are remarkably constrained their free behaviors, their own values, identities, interests, to a great extent, depend on one another. The inclination, moreover, enhances its degree and size due to the global space of increased political, economic, and cultural connection channels. Even the largest and most powerful states cannot sometimes get "their principal purposes—security, economic well-being, and a decent level of amenity for their

citizens—without the help and cooperation of many other participants in in the system, including entities that not states at all⁴⁴⁾.” Every state by no means deal with decision-making on the global space favourably for their own values, identities, and interests. Conversely, they should more strongly restrict these behaviors over value-allocation.

Since global network of value-allocation relationship not only makes its space enlarge but also makes its space complex and intimate in quality as well as in quantity, every state cannot avoid to be comprehensively constrained its autonomous decision-making behavior, and is to lose its supreme governing power. The more closed its framework increases, the more strong the constant pressures becomes. If some states try to neglect and destroy by themselves the complex network of value-allocation relations, it, all the more, deprive them of their possible behaviors to be free from other states’ pressures. Consequently, the globalization of system may deprive most states of their supreme governing power.

To lose or reduce supreme decision-making authority over global value-allocation means for sovereign states to be unable to govern and manage pressures and influence of a complex network within their own political, economic, and cultural borderline, namely territory. And their domestic decision-making power may become to weaken their governability and functions. For the territory as the hard political space cannot defend pressures and influences from the global system. It may be equated with the change of domestic decision-making mechanism itself. This seems little doubt that the domestic decision-making process is closely connected with the international decision-making process through the globalization of the system. That is to say, the globalization of the domestic politics and the domesticization of international politics are increasingly proceeded in the global system. These linkage phenomena of both decision-making processes can make state sovereignty weaken and reduce remarkably. The increase of

these linkage phenomena leads to reduce autonomous supreme power of most states. In practice, linkage phenomena can by no means be come out of enlarged pressures and influence from the global system.

At the same time, they are also the production of demands and pressures of domestic decision-making. The increase of people's demand of political, economic, cultural values and interests or ideas(objectives) towards their governments is, more and more, strengthening. People want to participate positively in decision-making process and to claim or exert the right to get favorable value-allocation more than now. Most sovereign states can no more neglect, constrain such people's demand of value-allocation. Because every government not only cannot have effective power and legitimized reason to reject and resist people's demands, but also cannot maintain its supreme governing power without people's support and consent, resulting for governments in joining the global decision-making authority, and constituting positively better complex of network of relationships.

Governments must project people's demand, values, identities into the global system. In short, The increasing linkage of both decision-making processes depends on domestic pressure and influence too. In this means, state sovereignty, namely autonomous supreme governing power may conspicuously be reduced. If states' autonomy means that states "may formulate and pursue goals that are not simply reflective of the demands or interests of social groups classes, or society⁴⁵⁾." Today we can no longer discover their autonomy. Far from it, it is very difficult to find out states' autonomy capable of negating, making light of, and governing global influences and pressures.

Consequently, state sovereignty reduced by the increased globalization of the system, to maintain, supplement, or revive its autonomous decision-making power, most positively coordinate with other sovereignties and shape, maintain, and increase cooperative relationships with others. This, in effect,

implies the consequence of reduction of autonomous supreme governing authority. State sovereignty may self-reduce its governing power. Every state must reasonably control its behaviors. Admittedly, within a wider structure context brought about by globalization among states are obliged to transform the former collective actions over decision-making process. A complex of globalization of goods and assets cannot avoid to undermining the effective state-centric collective action⁴⁶⁾. Much more, in the global system with various global (planetary) problems such as the North-South problem, the nuclear proliferation crisis, armes races, national-religious conflicts, the violation of human rights, environmental destructions, poverty, starvation, population growth, inequality, the exhaustion of energy, muldevelopment, and the like, every sovereignty can never govern and resolve with its own capability those global problems without cooperating with others. Global problems can by no means be solved without strong cooperations among states⁴⁷⁾.

As long as sovereign states proceed cooperations with other states, they, as a result are to reduce its autonomous governing power without no solution of those problems. Because the global system faced with global problems can eventually supply the arena of non-zero sum game rather than one of zero sum game. In case that there is common problems, values, interests, identities for one's own capability and behavior able to be resolved among political entities, there is no possibility for one to get values and interests. By contrast, all political entities gain mutual value and interest by cooperation among them or lose mutual value and interest. It is very possible for those political entities to get compatibility of value and interest. Without a certain cooperation, it is difficult for them to avoid incompatibility of value and interest. Although cooperations of their actors may lead them to reduce their autonomous decision-making power, this essentially means the equally maintenance of their governing power in a

non-zero sum situation.

In sum, global social problems undermine the sovereignty of the state in these ways:

- 1) it directs individual political preferences;
- 2) it delegitimizes the nation-state as a problemsolver;
- 3) it sets up new international organizations to which some elements of state sovereignty are progressively surrendered⁴⁸⁾.

Today we can no longer discover its autonomy. Far from it, it is difficult to find out state's autonomy capable of negating, making light of, and governing global influences and pressures.

The another important evidence that state sovereignty is restricted and reduced admittedly shows that voluminous non-state actors, international organizations, transnational actors, subnational actors, non-governmental organizations, individuals have appeared, participated in the global decision-making process and played a role challenging state sovereignty in the one hand, and substituting or making up for a governing power in the other. Originally, sovereignty "is the ground rule of interstate relations in that it identifies the territorial entities who are obligable to participate in the game⁴⁹⁾". Now this rule cannot hold good owing to various transnational activities in the game of the global system.

Without constraint or control of state sovereignty, non-state actors, transnational actors with a certain decision-making power participate in the global system, and then they constitute innumerable transnational relations not only among non-state actors but also between non-state actors and sovereign states. Of course, these transnational actors may directly or indirectly affect and constrain behaviors of one's own state. Transnational actors are sometimes more powerful than many sovereign states as for deciding value-allocation. There are a lot of chances for sovereign state to permit the existence and function of these transnational actors and to

support as well as to be supported by, these actors. Various actors reduce state identity, and seek for global, supranational, subnational, transnational, and local identity. While “the growing interest responsibilities, but at the same time they reenforce the need for institutional symmetry among national units⁵⁰⁾.”

Certainly, the capacity of governments continues to live in international relations. “The communications revolution is inexorably intervening national economies, confusing national identities and redefining the limits of national sovereignty.” Insofar as these governments cannot successfully respond to emerging problems, they end to damage both their own national interests and the multinational enterprises’ interests⁵¹⁾. Every government loses, anyhow, autonomous governing power.

And sovereign states must potentially construct inter-governmental organizations in order to gain and maintain common political, economic, cultural, and global interests through cooperating with others. To constitute and join larger political entities such as UN, WTO, NATO, EU, ASEAN, OPEC means for states to permit by themselves the restriction of their autonomous decision-making power. Such conditions suggest the evidence that every sovereign state cannot, in fact, get its value and interest, and cannot resolve conflicting problems by its own governing power because of the globalization of the international system. All transnational actors including inter-governmental organizations construct a complex and ungovernmental web of relationships that extends beyond the nation-state. The larger and the deeper the scale and degree of a complex network of transnational relationships become, the stronger state’s behaviors are constrained, and their autonomous governing power are reduced.

The eruption of these above conditions producing the autonomous governing power over the global value-allocation may lead sovereign states to constituting a larger and global political entity positively through still

more reducing the autonomous governing power of states. A system of global governance is therefore emerging with its own policy development and administrative systems which further curtails state's supreme decision-making power⁵²⁾.

In sum, from the standpoint of the transformation, reduction, and weakness of state sovereignty based on such conditions, we can principally describe the meaning and functions of the international system among sovereign states as well as the position and functions of sovereign state in the global system as follows:

- 1) although sovereign states in the global system (the world social system) remain still the largest political behavior entities, they have brought about the fall of their supreme position, have transformed traditional autonomous governing power, and have reduced especially these functions of security, economic development, and domestic governance;
- 2) these transformations were derived from the reality that state's functions were always globalized conspicuously, and that their autonomous capabilities became weak by the development of globalization. Not only the domestization of international political economy but also the globalization of domestic political economy became ordinary;
- 3) therefore, sovereign states due to the globalization remain still survive in spite of the decline of these traditional function-position by means of losing governing power both in the domestic system and the global system alike;
- 4) however, the degree and significance of reduction of function-position of states are unequal to each state. Despite the fact that every state can by no means avoid common pressures and influences of the globalization of the system, there is a huge gap between the degree


and significance of developed countries constituting symmetrical relationship among states with almost equal governing power in the one hand, and of developing countries constituting asymmetrical relationship between them and developed countries in the other. The asymmetrical structure of the global system produce the different position, function, degree, and meaning of governing power between the former and the latter;

- 5) the transformation and reduction of state's function generate, to a great extent, various non-state political entities with a certain value and interest. They are the actors with a certain governing power in the global system. these transnational actors, regardless of inter-governmental actors or nongovernmental actors, positively carry out various transnational and national functions, resulting in constituting an important part of the global system. The governing power of transnational actors constitute conflicting relations in the one hand and cooperative relations in the other;
- 6) the changing international system since 1648 when the Westphalian system established among modern sovereign states remain still survive fundamentally as the states system. But the contemporary states system can have no longer preserved the former supreme position, function, and governing power. In particular, not only sovereign states but also the states system itself might completely have lost those functions such as security, peace, economic development, and various global problem-solving function;
- 7) accordingly, in order to maintain and develop the global system including the states system, a global governance system is partly running with its own policy development and governing power which further reduces state's autonomous governing power.

On the whole, we must, therefore, describe, as follows, the former


international system constituted among sovereign states with supreme autonomous governing powers in the one hand and the global system constructed by sovereign states with less governing power and transnational actors with a certain decision-making power in the system in the other⁵³).

Figure 5



See William D. Coplin, *Introduction to International Politics: A Theoretical Overview*, 2nd edition (Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing Company, 1974), p. 402.

Figure 6 The global system



5. New State Sovereignty and the Global Governing System

Certainly, although state sovereignty has increasingly transformed the position and function, and reduced their autonomous supreme governing

power, In the while they do not vanish and remain still survival. Moreover, alternative sovereignty will be sought for in the global system. How can we explain the ambiguous and ambivalent reality with weakened sovereignty and understand the pressing primary position and function in the global system? "A possible explanation is that politics is a highly territorial activity and that the organized nation-state is the most effective means for establishing sovereignty over territory that human beings have yet devised. Globalization is a process with a spatial referent but that paradoxically threatens territorial sovereignty. The state might therefor just be the final bastion of resistance to globalizing trends and key indicator of their ultimate effectivity. If state survive globalization then it cannot be counted the force that it currently appears to be⁵⁴⁾."

It is undeniable that a new global political entity with a larger governing power rather than sovereign states have not yet existed, and then have never displaced for sovereign states in the global system. As long as a new global governing political entity capable of deciding global value-allocation instead of nation-state cannot appear here, we have to continue to debate upon state sovereignty problems. Not surprisingly, it is not easy to conceive of alternatives able to displace for sovereign state recognized as the most organizing power of political life in the contemporary global system. But it is not necessary to transform a profound international structure supporting sovereignty of states⁵⁵⁾. Sovereignty has so far transformed and has now a large changing movement into some alternatives.

What is ultimately at issue is that we must start on the basis of recognition of the fact that through the consideration of the global system, state sovereignty is critically reducing its autonomous supreme governing power, resulting for sovereign state in being unable to decide by itself completely identity, value, and interest of its own state, and that state sovereignty can actually become an important obstacle against constructing

effective global governing system making it possible to arrange a conflict situation and to resolve all essential problems in the global system. Accordingly, this does not mean the necessity to negate, somehow or another, state sovereignty itself. There is not necessarily exclusive and incompatible relationship between state sovereignty and a global governing system. What is the most essential is that we, humankind, and world must be emancipated from the myth of state sovereignty.

In that case, what state sovereignty can be constructed? Can we have a new sovereignty? "Contemporary developments in the field of international relations impose new demands for complex cooperative activity among states and other international actors, extending over time. It is increasingly clear that no single country—or small group of countries—no matter how powerful, can consistently achieve its objectives through unilateral action or ad hoc coalition. It is this condition that we call the new sovereignty⁵⁶⁾."

International and transnational interactions are in quality and in quantity increasing in the global system. In the process of globalization of the system, global problems such as environmental destructions and the violation of human rights have become the international agenda. In accordance with such movements, cooperative activities among actors have generated, resulting in engendering, regulating norms and creating a compliance prone environment⁵⁷⁾.

We can call such a sovereignty as common or interdependent sovereignty. In order to get common objectives by enhancing international relations, states mutually restrain or reduce their supreme governing power at the same degree. Common sovereignty may be based on the condition that by such behaviors, both can get their common objectives and interests without both's loss. While we can admittedly find out such common sovereignty in the contemporary global system, its sovereignty has a certain limitation. Because common sovereignty can relatively be constituted among states

constructing symmetrical relationships in terms of power, value, interest, position, objective. So this common sovereignty seems, at the same time, to contain potentially status quo-oriented quality. States can, in fact, maintain the same standard of governing relations with other states.

Historically speaking, while state territorial sovereignty appears to be an assumption of the international legal order, we can easily discover the fact that the sovereignty of state is, in practice, violated by another. So, "Territorial sovereignty is seen simply as a function of a state's economic and political might⁵⁸⁾." It is undeniable that there is a large gap between sovereignties. They can by no means be equal to one another. But today it is difficult for the strong to preserve and develop its situation, through the fundamental transformation of the global environment over their sovereignties. The transformation is directing the strong to reduce its gap not only from simply legal obligation but also from realistic demand of the global system.

However, when there is the asymmetrical relationship between both states, it is very difficult to construct properly common sovereignty. For example, while a developed country and a developing country can have common problems to be resolved, common interests, common values, both have also different problems, conflicting values and interests. Although most states heavily depend on the international system for these welfare as well as for their liberty. Rather the relations between important powers or international organizations and weak states are equal to one of international clientalism and dependency⁵⁹⁾. Rather the relations between both conspicuously asymmetrical dominance-dependency relations. Both position different places in the global system. To put it differently, it is not interdependent relations between both, but dependent relations of developing countries that is a weak feature of the global system. Insofar as the asymmetrical relations between both may be there, with the result of

zero sum structure with one's gain and the other's loss. In this sense, the significant point to remind is that while developed countries have, in fact, strong governing power over developing countries, the latter is deprived, in reality, of their sovereignty, and it is one-sidedly constructed by one of developed countries.

What is the most crucial problem as for developing countries is that they try to constitute an equal sovereignty to developed countries. Its sovereignty can be called as equal sovereignty, and it may also be considered as anti-status quo-oriented sovereignty. In the light of these developing countries, the problem of sovereignty must be approached from such a perspective. In other words, it is essential for realizing sovereignty of these states to use the approach of international political economy⁶⁰⁾. In that sense, we should ask the whose sovereignty problem. "It is also misleading theoretically to posit all states as sovereign equals in the international system. States may be equal in the formal, judicial sense covered by the concept of negative sovereignty. Yet they may be great variation in terms of positive sovereignty, as well as in the operational sovereignty, of states⁶¹⁾." Nevertheless, this claim is constituting to equal sovereignty. Because the latter, above all, emphasizes that there are sovereign inequals in the global system, sovereignty of the strong must recognize the realistic equality of the weak.

However, we should suggest another type of sovereignty besides above two types. It is human sovereignty or global sovereignty. It focuses on the condition that instead of sovereign relationship between state and state, we must approach the sovereign relationship from the global (world) society and mankind. That is to say, instead of thinking that states are the subject of sovereignty, the opinion that sovereignty is based on mankind society must be demanded by states. This does not necessarily mean that state sovereignty, must be renounced. Rather, even if states preserve sovereign-

ty, states can identity mankind society's sovereignty, values, interests, and identity. States don't execute their sovereignties for their own value, interest, identity, but carry out for human society. Through its temptation, state can make actually sovereignty insignificant. In that sense, the kind of sovereignty may be called mankind (human) sovereignty or global sovereignty. The construction and development of global governance system implies the possibility to construct and develop human sovereignty.

Notes

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