

《論 說》

Globalization and Global Governance

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1. Introduction: Globalization and Global Politics

Nowadays we, human beings, are confronted with various global problems and conflicts. With globalization, world politics is exceedingly so gigantic, complex, changable, daily, structural, and indeterminate that it becomes fragmentary, disordered, and conflicting. More appropriately speaking, the formation of global politics can bring about two opposing forces and orientations: fragmentary, disordered, conflicting forces and integrative, ordered, cooperating ones. The former concretely results in global problems and crises such as nuclear proliferation, arms races, the North-South problem, national and religious conflicts, environmental pollutions, the explosion of population, the exhaustion of energy, poverty, malnutrition, the expression of human rights, social injustice, refugee problem, AIDs, and the like. On the contrary, the latter can lead us to international and regional integrations, political stability, the formation of cooperative system, the development of international organizations and regimes, the spread of social movements, the construction of global civil society, and so on.

Such a complex situation of world politics reflects global politics, in other words, a transformative international politics in terms of globalization of the world¹⁾. Nation-states have fully not prepared for themselves for global structural changes in the global system. They have effectively not

responded to those conflicts, and not supplied any effective means and institutions capable of resolving them.

In world politics "a variety of contemporary phenomena are straining the traditional state-centric system from both above and below." These include international organizations, national separate movements, international terrorists organizations, international non-governmental organizations, etc²⁾.

Consequently, in stead of state-centric governance, globality-centric governance is required in terms of the necessity and possibility of global solving, that is to say, global arrangement. "Governance is ultimately concerned with creating the conditions for ordered rule and collective action. The outputs of governance are not therefore different from those of government. It is rather a matter of a difference in processes³⁾." What is important is that the essence of global governance depends on an effectiveness of international arrangement mechanism not through formal authority of governments.

There is no doubt that global problems with globalization are beyond a governing capability of nation-states. Every government can find it difficult for globalization to provide it with security, stable economy, just order, and sustainable ecological environment. The content and scope of nation-states' capacity to govern global conflicts are, one after another, weakening. Generally speaking, due to the changing meaning and function of national border through the increasing interdependence among states, one state can easily intervene and influence other's decision-making processes and social lives. In the process of globalization, no state or society can any more preserve the high fence able to protect itself from intervention from other states and societies. What is more clear is that every actor can by no means preserve its own framework of decision-making mechanism exclusively available to its own power and interests. So, since one state is no longer able to solve a host of urgent problems by its own efforts, it

should look for an certain order that promises to make it possible to solve them. This attempt to govern problems seems to be called global governance⁴⁾.

It is evident that the loss or/and weakness of states' capacity to govern fully global problems and conflicts lead world politics to the creation of global governance. However, "[t]his does not mean that there is a compelling need for immediate action to create a world government or, in other words, a central public authority or complex of organizations endowed with the authority" to restrict state sovereignty of members and to compel any state to comply with rules capable of ensuring cooperation among them⁵⁾. Needless to say, various structures support the construction, maintenance, and development of global governance. However, we cannot find out world government among their structures. We can imperfectly order over public affairs at the global level not only through state interventions but also through myriads of other more informal international and transnational actors⁶⁾.

Nevertheless, owing to its ambiguous concept, it is not easy to define global governance. Global governance is interchangingly used with international institution, international regime or/and global order. In order for the concept of governance to have usefulness to govern global and complicated conflicts in the global system, it is necessary for it to be defined appropriately. Despite the fact, what matters is rather the essential position and real meanings of global governance in global politics.

Accordingly, it is natural that there are three approaches to global governance responding to global problems and crises: governance without government, developmental regime, and people-centric self governance. While their approaches share a common consciousness of the necessity to construct global governance, each approach has a different attitude towards global governance⁷⁾.

To illuminate the position, function, structure, and meaning of global governance in the global system, we must consider not only its structure and meaning but also the structural characteristics of global politics. For the idea of global governance has emerged in the formation of global politics with globalization. Through its investigation, we can understand the essence of global governance in world politics as well as the certain concept of global governance. "Suitably circumscribed, the notion of governance possesses descriptive and analytical virtues. While it betokens no major epistemological breakthrough, it is certainly handy. It facilitates the presentation and deployment of knowledge on the current functioning of international relations in a context that has changed enormously since the seventies." However, what has to be noticed is that governance also has its limitations and a high mystification potential⁸⁾.

To recognize properly the meaning of its paradox too, we should make clear some relationships between global governance and globalization. What is more, we should make efforts of investigating the relationship between globality-centric governance and state-centric governance, and one between governance on the one hand and other concepts such as regime, institution, global civil society, Non-Governmental Organization (NGO), social movement on the other hand. In addition to them, the relationship between positive global governance and negative one must be clarified by definition. Through these considerations, it is not difficult to grip the position and meaning of global governance in world politics.

This article aims to illuminate the position, structure, and meaning of global governance in global politics by means of analyzing relationship between globalization and global governance. Accordingly, second, the concept of global governance will be discussed from different angles. Third, the meaning, scope, and limit of traditional state-centric governance should be examined. Fourth, we will make clear the reason and process of

construction of global governance with the establishment of global politics. Fifth, the structure of global governance composed of various actors such as states, NGO, intergovernmental organization, global civil society will be analyzed with focusing on the idea of globality-centric governance. Sixth, through considering the relationship between state-centric governance and global civil society, desirable global governance will be required in terms of suggesting the positive global governance.

2. The Concept of Global Governance

What is global governance? Although it is difficult to define clearly governance, we, first of all, must extract governance concept through its relationship to government. For government composes a main kind of governance. Of course, a government is not equal to governance itself. The problem is that, with globalization, governments have, a great extent, lost their governing capability to resolve global conflicts. So, what deserves to be pointed out is to look into how governance can function in the absence of a world government, namely, without a global formal authority. According to J.Rosenau, "[t]o presume the presence of governance without government is to conceive of functions that have to be performed in any usable human system irrespective of whether the system has envolved organizations and institutions explicitly charged with performing them."⁹⁾ He regards governance as a set of functionally effective regulation mechanisms for activity of human beings without formal authority.

The idea of governance challenges most assumptions of government, that is to say, traditional public administration. G. Stoker provides the following five propositions of governance.

- 1) Governance refers to a set of institutions and actors that are drawn from but also beyond government.

- 2) Governance identifies the blurring of boundaries and responsibilities for tackling social and economic issues.
- 3) Governance identifies the power dependence involved in the relationships between institutions involved in collective action.
- 4) Governance is about autonomous self-governing networks of actors.
- 5) Governance recognizes the capacity to get things done which does not rest on the power of government to command or use its authority. It sees government as able to use new tools techniques to steer and guide¹⁰⁾.

These propositions are considered to be complementary rather than contradictory or in competition. In essence, the idea of governance without government was by no means a new one. Non-government was traditionally a dominant map of international relations. At the same time, anarchy fundamentally distinguished international political system from domestic system. While the former has no supreme authority capable of restricting and controlling states' behaviours, the latter has a supreme authority, namely, formal governing entity able to coerce and control legitimately other's behaviours. Under an anarchical society every state must take a same action through its own power including military force and war.

However, it is evident that such a view causes various questions from the standpoint of the changing real international politics: 1) it is wrong that anarchy can divide international politics and domestic politics into two parts perfectly, and the difference between the former and the latter lies not in its quality but in its degree; 2) there are diverse rules and methods such as balance of power, international law, international institutions, diplomacy, common interest, role of great powers, deterrence, non-intervention, mutual recognition of sovereignty, resting in governing capability; 3) even a state with a supreme authority cannot in full respond to changing international politics with various, global, and complex problems and crises; 4) numerous

actors, organizations, and movements participate in the arena of international politics, and increasingly gain an importantly growing capability able to manage and settle global problems. So, governments become fully neither a sufficient condition nor a necessary one. That is to say, governments cannot necessarily guarantee any governance, and without governments some governance may be come out¹¹⁾.

The emphasis of governance without government suggests that it is clearly different from governance without government. It follows that there are two different orientations of governance: horizontal governance and vertical one. The former means that the governor and the governed may construct an equal or symmetrical relationship, vis. co-governance. The latter signifies that the governor and the governed may construct an unequal or asymmetrical relationship, vis. top-down-governance. Top-down-governance we can regard as state-centric governance supported by states. So far has vertical governance prevailed in the international system. Nowadays its vertical governance has gradually weakened, and instead horizontal governance has gradually increased with globalization.

In consequence, this is to mean that the essence of governance is governing mechanisms lying not on coercion or dominance but on non-violence or non-control. However, it is right that the idea of governance without government that "the concept of governance excludes, by definition, any idea of centralised organization or control. Conversely, it postulated a proliferation of modes of organization, levels and decision-making authorities¹²⁾." Generally speaking, governance as a whole may, in essence, not only derive from governments through coercion, but also from civil society's shared goals and non-violent measures capable of giving ultimately their influence on global public opinion¹³⁾. Since the notion of governance involves the nuance of domination, public and private actors at the same time, and formal institution, we cannot easily point to the

difference between governance and government.

Next, in order to manifest the essence of governance, we must clearly illuminate a close relationship between governance and order. Like governance, order has various routinized arrangements capable of governing properly and effectively decision-making process on value-allocation, with the result of restricting actors' behaviours, social movements, and social life. Order is composed of two factors: regularity of practices (methods) and equity of value-allocation, namely, routinized arrangements deciding social value-allocation and equality of content (quality) of social value-allocation. Put another way, the former implies that there are routinized practices deciding value-allocation or persistent sets of global rules that constrain actors' behaviours over value-allocation regardless of its content of value-allocation. The latter means routinized arrangements able to make it possible to decide equally value-allocation among actors¹⁴⁾.


Regularity of practices is almost similar to top-down governance. J. Rosenau insists that governance is order plus intentionality¹⁵⁾. Some of arrangements derive from self-conscious efforts designed to sustain them. He emphasizes that effective and desirable arrangements rather stem from self-conscious activities with the aim to maintain positively the order¹⁶⁾. Self-conscious activities can make it possible to promote more the strength of routinized arrangements. What is more, the importance of self-conscious activities derives from the fact that without their activities every actor can no longer sustain and develop a certain order inclined to become unstable under a increasingly changable world politics. At any rate, there is no doubt that governance and order are clearly interactive phenomena. "[O]rder is both a precondition and a consequence of government. There can be no governance without order and there can be no order without governance."¹⁷⁾ Accordingly, global governance is imagined to be a single set of self-consciousness.

Here we must refer to the relationship between governance and regime. What has to be noticed is that the notion of governance, in a sense, is the development of the notion of international regime. Well, we traditionally paid main attention to the formal organization of states and possession of legitimate coercive power to shape and maintain order. So, the idea of regime, criticizing static and formal approach to international organization or institution, suggests a new map describing a routinized international society through various informal and formal organizations and institutions without world government. From the functional point of view, regime, like order, organization, and institution, is a routinized arrangement for the maintenance and stable development of international society. The most popular concept of international regime is defined "as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectation converge in a given area of international relations." That is to say, regimes are composed of four different level components: principles (beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude), norms (standards of behavior defined in terms of rights of obligation), rules (specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action), and decision-making procedures (prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice)¹⁸⁾.

In consequence, the function and role of various regimes such as trade, finance, fishing, energy, environment, human rights, security, and the like are, to an important degree, stressed. At issue here is that diverse symbols without the systemization of these regimes, individually and separately, are treated, resulting in being unable to describe a total system of regimes capable of giving a comprehensive meaning and position in the international system as a whole. The appearance and development of governance concept respond to its issue. Accordingly, it follows that governance is a set or complex of regimes, namely, routinized arrangements in the global system. As Figure 1 suggests, we can come grips with the relationships

among order, organization, institution, regime, governance, and global politics. Organizations signify a complex of social rules controlling social relations of actors.

Figure 1



There is no surprise that global governance is not equal to global or world government. The vision of global governance corresponds more to the kind of world federation with an indispensable minimum of centralization. Global governance is not based on global state. The world government seems to form a single political entity. Global governance does not aim at the creation of a new world order. It constitutes what is almost a contrasting model to hegemonial concepts of world order. Global governance implies the role of international law and the acceptance of global ethics of responsibility. It means more than just creating the overall conditions and rules for the various areas of politics.

Accordingly, global governance does not signify either the hierarchical direction of integrated society by a world government, or simply the sum of the activities of nation-states. It accompanies an increase in multilateralism and a globally oriented foreign policy; what it means is, in considerable measure, the cooperation of state and non-state actors and new forms of common problem-solving from the local to the global level.

As noted above, we must outline three significant conditions in case of

supposing the position and meaning of global governance: 1) global governance means redefining sovereignty undermined by globalization. It requires the acceptance of the sharing of sovereignties through the transfer of competencies to local, regional, and global organizations; 2) global governance means the intensification of international cooperation by means of international regimes and organizations governed by binding rules of cooperation in correspondence to states' reduced capacity for problem-solving; 3) global governance means becoming aware that we have vital interests in common, and questing for a foreign policy geared to the global common goods. Under increasingly global interdependences, international cooperation becomes imperative¹⁹⁾.

In consequence, on considering the meaning of governance in the global system, it is necessarily adequate to emphasize that "the concept of governance excludes, by definition, any idea of centralized organization on control. Conversely, it postulates a proliferation of modes of organization, levels and decision-making authorities."²⁰⁾ At the same time, it is true of the necessity of construction of global government. The most important point to note regarding the essence of governance is that it not only encompasses the activities of governments, but also includes any actors who possess and use command mechanism to make demands, frame goals, issue directives, and pursue policies. For, under fragmented and disordered international system innumerable actors extraordinarily take actions along and across the Frontier²¹⁾.

Through taking it considerations these essential conditions, we can gain the following proper concept of governance and global governance:

Governance is the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and co-operative action may be

taken. It includes formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangement that people and institutions either have agreed to or perceive to be in their interests. ----- At the global level, governance has been viewed primarily as intergovernmental relationships, but it must now be understood as also involving non-governmental organizations (NGO), citizens' movements, multinational corporations, and the global capital market. Interacting with these are global mass media of dramatically enlarged influence²²⁾.

In terms of such the concept, we can clarify the position, structure, and meaning of traditional state-centric governance in old and contemporary political system.

3. The Essence and Characteristics of State-centric Governance

Global governance does not mean to negate the governance of states and among states, namely, formal political entities. Global governing entities of nation-states are a partial of global governance composed of a variety of actors. Global governance or international governance has so far been a set of routinized arrangement among states. It is called state-centric governance. The Westphalian temple as the system of states has essentially conditioned the structure and functioning of world politics since the seventeenth century. M. Zacher argues that the growth of institutions, regimes, interdependence, and regulatory ventures of governance in the contemporary world politics. States are becoming more and more enmeshed in a network of collaborative arrangements and regimes capable of providing world politics with a new and different mold from the one that has existed in recent centuries. Every state reduces its dominant position and governing capability. The maintenance of the sovereign state is

becoming less and less credible.²³⁾

First of all, in order to manifest the position, structure, and meaning of global governance, it is necessary for position and meaning of traditional state-centric governance to be investigated.²⁴⁾

In practice, the state has been the central entity of international governance since the mid-seventeenth century. Traditional governance has been based mainly on the state and inter-governmental institutions. It is evident that the origin of state-centric governance can be traced to the establishment of Westphalian system permitting formally sovereign state as a unique actor in international society. Up to the present, the dominant feature of international politics has been the process of decision-making over international values among states extremely through the threat and use of military force. Because every state has a supreme power (authority), the state(s) system is automatically under anarchy without authoritative governmental entity beyond states. State sovereignty is the supreme principle of international politics; the principle supports a dominant actor in international politics, mutual recognition of state sovereignty, the principle of non-intervention, the legitimacy of military force's use, the right of national interest, and the like. On the formation of such principles, international politics has fundamentally started, developed, and changed. Moreover, international politics has been supported by the principles such as balance of power, international law, and international institution stemmed from the principle of state sovereignty. International politics as the framework of governing states' behaviour has been created exclusively by the maintenance and development of the sovereign states.

What matters is rather that such principles and institutions could make it possible to bring about and maintain even incompletely international governance. It is easy to construct a concrete decision-making mechanism over international values without an international government, namely, a

concrete authoritative political entity. As long as states themselves can positively produce and affirmly maintain and successfully develop those principles and mechanisms, the international system may preserve a certain order without government. There is no doubt that, regardless of government's existence, governance can, to great degrees, be supported by states themselves. While state sovereignty became the essential principle of political organization and the core foundation sustaining international regimes as well. The content, meaning, and size of state sovereignty are, in reality, not equal to every state. Admittedly, There was and is its concrete asymmetrical quality among real powers. Such a gap led every state to make alliances and alignments among great powers in order to maintain and enlarge its own interest, values, power. No wonder that the principle of balance of power could make a great role to keep the structure of power distribution among states and to make and strengthen a dominant framework against other states and colonies. Nevertheless, international law, international institution, international convention, diplomacy, international organization, and balance of power principle could in full not guarantee effective cooperation among states. So long as the asymmetrical relationship of power among states dominates the international system, it is extremely impossible to transform state-centric governance, especially great powers-centric governance. The most clear example is the failure of realization of New International Economic Order (NIEO).

Accordingly, first of all, in the traditional international system, there was the dominant process in which only great powers make a crucial decision over relatively simple value-allocation for themselves. For this international system of decision-making had a relatively narrow scope, low regularity in content, and little dynamic movement, state-centric governance had also its limited scope, irregularity, and non-dynamics.

Second, because international political process of value-allocation was

definitely separated from domestic one, state-centric governance was also greatly separated from domestic governance. As long as the international system was composed of sovereign states only as unique actors, it is easy to distinguish international process of value-allocation from domestic one. There was almost no opportunity for domestic process to influence or tie international one, and vice versa. Both processes were considered to be problems in different political spheres. International governance of security, peace, economic development, the maintenance of socio-cultural values, and the environmental sustainability did not give direct influence on domestic governance, and vice versa.

Third, it seems likely that military power as means of decision-making over international value-allocation could finally sway the essence and structure of states system. Every sovereign state, regardless of its size, has possessed a virtual monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. We could discover the central role of violence in both the constitutive character and the external relations of states. Since there were almost no authoritative governing entity in the system of states, and there were no homogeneity of economic development, common value, and common consciousness among states as some important conditions of international community, it is not surprising that what military force should be sways what the system of states should be. In the anarchical international society, henceforth, it is serious for one state to restrain and control freely other's behaviours and interaction mode among states. From such a perspective, the means capable of controlling other's behaviour and the structure of international relations was inclined to become military forces. What is important is that military force as the means themselves is to aimize. So, the struggle for power increasingly becomes popular, and arms races intensely become dominant with the aim to enlarge military force of great powers. 'The jungle rule' that the militarily strong win and the weak lose generally

prevailed among most states. Moreover, war was, in essence, legitimized as proper means able to get its own interest. Generally speaking, the existence of military power itself on the one hand, may make it possible to destroy its interest.

In the final analysis, on considering such the state-centric governance, we must pay attention to the structure of value-allocation in the system of great powers. The international system has two contrasting aspects: center as relations among great powers constructing the symmetrical power relationship, periphery constructing asymmetrical power relationship with the center. State-centric governance may exceedingly prevail in the center. Conversely, even state-centric governance may be difficult to prevail in asymmetrical power relationship between center and periphery. What is made clear, first and foremost, is that the predominant pattern of international governance, in reality, has been and is state-centric governance, namely, top-down governance.

4. Globalization and Globality-centric Governance

On discussing on some governance in the contemporary international (global) system, we should consider changing global politics with the globalization of world. Due to the formation of global politics, global governance may appear extremely in the global system, "[G]lobalization suggests a significant intensification of global connectedness and a consciousness of that intensification, with a corresponding diminution in the significance of territorial boundaries and state structures." The globalization of world has been promoted by various factors such as technological development, particularly marvelous development of communication technology, economic expansion at a worldwide scale, global scope of political relationships, has been deepened by global dissemination of ideas,

and has more and more been advanced as a set of changing processes through these factors.²⁵⁾

In order to grasp the essence and structure of contemporary global governance, we must, first of all, ask three problems of characteristics of globalization. The first problem is that globalization may influence all aspects of social life of human beings, namely, the global system including, in large measure, global politics. The global system is fundamentally composed of four subsystems: economy, polity, socio-culture, and ecology. Globalization has remarkably increased intimate relations among four subsystems, resulting in constituting a complex network of interdependencies among their subsystems. Especially, global economy and global politics have increasingly promoted the scope of mutual penetration. Since governance in global politics has close connections with other subsystems, and it has been global in scope, complex and multiple in content, changable in quality, structure in characteristic, we must recognize global problems in changing relations among four subsystems. More than anything else, the important thing to remember is that the scope of governance becomes worldwide, and that the meaning of governance comes to be complicated due to constructing close relations among four ones.

The second issue is the relationship between globalization and localization. Globalization and localization generally create a compatible relationship between both, and construct the tail and the head of coin. Put it differently, two processes of globalization of locality and localization of globality may progress simultaneously²⁶⁾. The border between global governance and local governance become extremely ambiguous. It is troublesome to divide clearly one governance into two parts.

Certainly, as J. Rosenau puts it, "[g]lobalization is rendering boundaries and identify with the land less salient while location, being driven by pressures to narrow and withdraw, is highlighting borders and intensifying

the deep attachments to land that can dominate emotion and reasoning." No doubt that globalization is boundary-eroding and localization is boundary-strengthening²⁷⁾. Nevertheless, this does not imply that globalization process can be opposed to localization one. Both movements can be compatible each other. Rather it means that globalization leads to localization, and the latter, in turn, promotes the former. So, both spheres of governance may be mutually connected with.

We must propose the third problem that globalization include two forces: integrating, ordering, and cooperating on the one hand and fragmentary, disordering, and conflicting on the other hand. One is to grasp the notion of governance not as only a single, integrative force, but as multiple, fragmentary complex forces²⁸⁾.

Above all, globalization concept should be conceived as dialectic one. It essentially involves cooperative forces, common culture system, and integrative movements on the one hand as well as the trend of politico-economic conflicts and socio-cultural conflicts on the other hand. Since globalization is discontinuing, disproportionate, and dialectic processes derived from two contradicting conditions, functions, movements, and trends, governance in world politics must be considered in dynamic and dialectic process, in which there are forces and conditions supporting governance and forces and movements negating it. Manifold conflicts and crises, disorder, and fragmentary forces or movements seem to have various chances to create governances. For, to arrange and settle these problems, what is essential is that with globalization of the world, the scope, content, and meaning of governance itself is always changing, resulting in bringing about dynamic, flexible governance.

In the long run, these problems of global governance derived from globalization are becoming essential challengers to the traditional framework of state-centric governance. For globalization can weaken the ability of

states to sustain a certain routinized economic and social regulation. It is noticeable that a changing international system in dint of globalization will quest for the construction or development of new political framework to respond to the reduction of government's governability²⁹⁾. Global forces prominently promote the destruction of an old framework of social order. "The global is much more of a challenge to the old order than the international or the transnational. It is a direct alternative to organization based on nation-state boundaries and categories."³⁰⁾ It is very likely that through destructing the old governing system, global governance tries to construct a new system which has structures of authorities at various levels of society within and without the state, above and below it. Evidently, transnational process developed by multiple actors beyond borders demand a new institutional response³¹⁾.

Then, we must investigate not only the structural features of global politics through globalization of the world, but also a position and meaning of global governance in world politics³²⁾.

First, the global decision-making process of value-allocation with a new structural feature is created, as the enlargement of political space on the global scale and the increasing interconnectedness of actors. Non-state actors, by a great degree, participate in the decision-making process and construct a complex decision-making system. In a new global system not only states but also multiple non-state actors and transnational actors pursue their own values and common values among non-state actors as well as between them and states, resulting in constructing relations over global value-allocation. The eruption and increase of non-state actors and transnational ones suggest the multification of values in the international system, and at the same time, represent the changing situation in which nation-states have lost the capacity and legitimacy to allocate appropriately various global values. No wonder that it is troublesome for states to allocate

freely and exclusively international values and interests in international society. The multiplicity of political actors with globalization have transformed a state-centric value-allocation process into a complex and multiple process. Non-state actors and transnational actors such as NGO, intergovernmental organizations, multinational corporations, guerrilla entities, mass movements, public opinions, international public opinions, regional organizations, ethnic groups, cities, locals, churches, can, directly and indirectly, join the global value-allocation process, ending of constructing a complex and multiple network of value-allocation. Although state-centric network of value-allocation still leads non-state-centric one, with globalization the latter is increasingly gaining more forces. Meanwhile, both networks are constructing a complex system unable to distinguish simply one from the other.

What is more, non-state actors and transnational actors may also form global civil society with autonomy not only influencing but also resisting inter-state relations. Nowadays various social movements and civil movements in the international system gain normalized forces. "Social movements in turn may become more formally organized at local and transnational levels. A three-stage process envisages (i) social forces provoked by the challenge of the conditions of existence affecting certain human groups, (ii) social movements which imply a self-consciousness in such groups and some sense of identity in struggle, and (iii) the formation of social organizations or agencies designed to carry forward the struggle³³⁾." Through such social and civil movements, global civil society is partly and incompletely constructed across national borders. Accordingly, the formation of global politics has transformed state-centric governance into multiple-complex governance. States have no longer supplied an insufficiently governance for the global system as a whole. State-centric governance is becoming only a part of globality-centric governance.

Second, we can indicate the fact that it is difficult to distinguish definedly domestic process of value-allocation from international one. The former and the latter may have influence on each other. Moreover, both may establish a complex linkage system. The political, economic, socio-cultural life within domestic society, to some extent, depends on what international relations should be. The maintenance and content of domestic daily life is affected not only by domestic politics, but also by the particular characteristic of international process of value-allocation making. On the contrary, domestic process of decision-making over value-allocation, domestic conditions, policies, and events penetrate into the international process of value-allocation beyond national boundaries, and then influence the process. It goes without saying that manifold non-state and transnational actors join the international system, and perform political functions. Internationalization of domestic politics and domestification of international politics are remarkably generalized.

Issues such as security, democracy, economic development, guarantee of human rights, cultural identity, sustenance of ecological environment are closely connected with each level: individual, local, national, transnational, international, regional, and global, with the result of having ambiguous border line among these levels. The same is true of non-proliferation of nuclear, the repression of human rights, poverty, malnutrition, starvation, social injustice, population-food-resource-energy problems. And one domestic political phenomena, for example, presidential election of America, at the same time, is also an international political event. Obviously, the election of the American President himself can directly influence the international system. There is no doubt that the choice of American President is the outcome of both the international system and domestic system of America. And the establishment of Gorbachev Government in the Soviet Union itself was a very international political phenomenon. His

'New Thinking Diplomacy' reflected domestic Perestroika, the international political structure of the Soviet Union, and the American-Russo relations. America and Western countries themselves directly supported and swayed Perestroika and Gorbachev Government. Consequently, the boundary between proper domestic governance and limited international governance was extremely ambiguous, and the linked scope of both governances enlarged. It is non-sense and difficult to distinguish meaninglessly the former from the latter. Proper state-centric governance reduced its sphere.

As the Third structural characteristic of global politics, we must point out fall of the function and role of military force as means capable of deciding value-allocation in global politics. The multiplication of international values, the multiplication of value-actors, the multiplication and linkage of domestic-international process of value-allocation, all could lead military force to functional reduction or loss of capability to decide value-allocation. Military force could incompletely guarantee even national security value. The increase of interdependencies among actors, the eruption of global problems, and a partial establishment of community consciousness of human beings have, more and more, promoted the reduction of role by military force.

In the era of nuclear, nuclear weapons could not be used besides a certain function of deterrence, and every state could easily not use even conventional weapons under the process of value-allocation making. These uses could not avoid high cost and risk to every actor. It might, without doubt, pay economic cost and political cost as well. The militarily aggressed could never accept its use of military force; they would resist it; they enhance their nationalism; users would be criticized by anti-war opinion and movement. It is arguable that military asymmetry itself would not guarantee the efficiency of military force. In case of American failure of the Vietnam War, of Soviet Russia's military action in Afganistan, of Iraq's failure of

military action into Kuwait, and of various regional and national conflicts such as Bosnia-Herzegovina War.

The more globalization promotes, it is hard to cling to the formula that value of possession of military force is equal to use-value and utility-value. Now the deterrent function of nuclear weapons itself is fundamentally questionable, and its possession itself seems to have dysfunction. To put it differently, their voluminous possession of conventional weapons as well as nuclear weapons, could have no effective significance, and could perform no desirable function. Rather, through the possession of unnumbered weapons, every state must cost a lot of grave risks. Undoubtedly, such conditions weaken state-centric governance. In a sense, military force, in fact, supported state-centric governance. However, globalization of the world brought about the reduction of traditional function of military force, and in addition to it, gave a blow to state-centric governance. It is natural that a new type of global governance has largely appeared in the global politics in order to take the place of traditional state-centric governance, and to supply a supplementary governance to state-centric one.

Fourth, we should suggest the strength of asymmetrical structure of value-allocation relation as the structural trait of global politics. As the process of value-allocation relationships among various actors on the global level enlarges, diverse networks of relationships among them are complicatedly constructed and with multi-layers. However, although the breadth of scope and the intensification of relationships among actors enhance their degrees, great powers-centric structure of value-allocation still remains fundamentally. Value-allocation structure between the center and the periphery, namely, dominance-dependency structure now dominates the essence and meaning of global politics. The process of establishment and development of modern state-centric system was simultaneously the one of colonization of the periphery by the center. While, at present,

colonized areas were more formally emancipated from European dominance, resulting in becoming independently sovereign states, in joining the international system, and for the system in enlarging on the global scale, the global system, in fact, is dominated by the asymmetrical relationship structure of value-allocation, in other words, the center-the periphery structure. In the center of the international system, there is the relative symmetrical structure of value-allocation among the East and the West or developed countries, but between the center and the periphery, viz. the Third World, there is the asymmetrical structure of value-allocation. It is the appearance of the North-South relation that is the extension of dominance-dependency structure of value-allocation between the center and the periphery in modern international society. Since the end of the Cold War the asymmetrical structure between the North and the South is now becoming the pivot of the global political system.

So, from the standpoint of governance, as noted above, governance cannot similarly and homogeneously operate and function in all areas of the global system. Governance has not a same meaning, position, and role for every state as well as every actor. Although, in particular, within the center state-centric governance seems to exist, there are few governance between the center and the periphery. It is not easy to construct and maintain global governance in grave asymmetrical structure of value-allocation.

The fifth basic feature is that there are various global problems and conflicts in the global system. The central issues in the traditional international system were issues over national security, military force, great powers' relations, and national interests. The enlargement of interdependent relations among global values, the increasing connectedness between one value or issue and other, the extension of value-allocation scope on the global scale, and multiplication and complex of value content, all make it difficult to resolve, arrange, control, and govern appropriately global

conflicts and problems without a strong and comprehensive governance system. The global system is covered with diverse global problems such as proliferation of nuclear weapons, arms race, the North-South problem, regional-national conflicts, cultural identity problems, ecological environmental destructions, the repression of human rights, population-food problems, refugee and immigration problems, AIDs, terrorism, poverty, malnutrition, social injustice, and the like.

These problems unavoidably influence on every state, every area, and every people in the global system. Since various problems are common to every state, every area, every people, and every human being, it is serious to settle fundamentally them without cooperations among actors on the basis of human being consciousness, global community consciousness, or common value and interest. As long as actors take positive actions to quest for some common values, these global crises more and more grow worse. We have, up to their point, had no proper governance system able to respond to and resolve global conflicts and problems stemmed from the changing global system. Consequently, state-centric governance can by no means arrange and resolve efficiently those problems, ending more and more at reducing states' capacity and legitimacy.

Sixth, we can single out the formation of cooperation system at the global level and the establishment of community consciousness even partially. In a sense, no wonder that global governance may be the cause and effect of global problems and crises. While there are global conflicts and problems derived from the global structure of value-allocation and from its relationship structure through these problems and crises, a partial human being consciousness and global community consciousness, common interest to settle them, cooperation system necessary to resolve them, and concrete mechanisms such as international organization, international institution, NGO, public and social movement, international law, international regime,


morality, balance of power, regional integration, global civil society, and global governance. We can easily discover some global governance without world government.

5. A Complex Structure of Global Governance

In order to understand the essence, function, and position of global governance in global politics, we must search for the structure of global governance. For global governance is composed of various levels of global scope. That is to say, global governance is a global, changable, complex, and structural process of value-allocation constructed by different actors in world politics. Although there is no doubt that states as one of many actors weaken their capability and function to arrange, control, and resolve manifold global problems and conflicts as dominant actors in global politics, states still remain major actors supporting global governance. State-centric governance retains partially its function and capability to arrange, control, and settle a part of global problems and structural crises.

However, of course, states are no more the only absolute actor able to

Figure 2: Complex Structure of Global Governance



govern global problems, and only state-centric governance can also no longer occupy the dominant sphere of global governance. In order to elucidate its point, we should question the structure of global governance. As Figure 2 shows, global governance has a complex structure organized by diverse levels of actors, forces, and movements.

States: States continue to be main constituent members of global governance. As mentioned already, they are generally losing their capacity to respond properly to a changing global environment with globalization of the world. States, irrespective of great powers or small powers, are more and more reducing their role to settle, arrange, and control various crises and conflicts. States could not keep space with a changing global system, resulting in losing their governing capacity. They are weakening an authoritative position over other actors composing together global governance. Nevertheless, this does not say that states are no longer dominant actors in world politics. States continue to keep the major, but even relative, actors in global politics, and most states still reform an indispensable function as a connector of various levels of actors within the structure of global governance. Furthermore, in spite of reducing the role of military force, only states can sustain the position and capability to possess and use military force as a method to allocate values. They may ultimately use violence to gain their own values at their disposal.

Notwithstanding, "government cannot cope. There is a great reluctance by politicians to admit this. But the reality is that political power is being fragmented. Additionally, the new political crises are more intangible than the old ones. The nuclear arms race, for example, was essentially between the US and USSR. By contrast, no one nation (or small group thereof) can be held responsible for global warming or the green house effect. Similarly, no one nation, acting on its own, can solve these crises." Hence, a new form of global governance will be quested for. In that case, we must make much

of a planetary perspective rather than an international perspective³⁴⁾. Needless to emphasize, military power or violence cannot fully become effective problem-means for global crises. It is natural that state-centric governance supported by military force convincingly weakens its position and capacity in the structure of global governance.

International regimes and organizations: So far have intergovernmental organizations such as the UN, IMF, OPEC, to a great extent, increased with globalization of international society. Every institution has a certain objective and capacity to resolve international problems through institutionalizing cooperating entities. Since intergovernmental organizations are formal ones, they reflect their own interest, value, and stand for states as well as a common interest and value for the international system. It is inevitable that international organization between one sovereign one and other is likely to be ultimately dominated by state sovereignty. However, with globalization states weaken their authoritative capacity to realize its own interest and value or to settle conflicts. So, most states should pursue common value and common behaviour, namely, cooperation under an interdependent global system not only to realize their own value but also to resolve international conflicts. The more every state are confronted with global crises and problems, the more it has to constitute international organizations, and they should construct international relations by means of their organizations. Accordingly, international organizations create one aspect of state-centric governance in the one hand, and, as the foreign policy of the US suggests, they may constitute rather one of global governance in the other hand.

What is more, important blocks for the framework of global governance are international regimes derived from states' interest to arrange common problems among states concerned. International regimes pay attention to institutionalized condition supporting informal rule and procedure without concrete and formal organization. As S. Krasner puts it, we can again

regard regimes as sets of implicit or explicit norms, rules, and decision-making procedures. Meanwhile, these regimes have no unlimited sphere of efficiency for global governance, but have a partial sphere of application. They have not a systemic framework, in which they may be comprehensively located. In spite of having such weak points, various and voluminous international regimes, in fact, constitute an important part of global governance.

Regional cooperation and integration (regionalism): Virtually, regional cooperation and integration also occupy an important position in the structure of global governance. The framework of global governance seems to be a complex structure composed of main centers of regional cooperation and integration, namely, regionalism. There are some regional (subordinate) systems as subsystems of the international system. While some regions are linked with international governance and are influenced by it, they have a certain governance capable of arranging, controlling, and resolving proper regional problems and conflicts in terms of cooperating methods. Globalization has necessarily promoted regional cooperation, integration, and regionalism, because of having common value or consciousness as well as regional conflicts or problems stemmed from globalization. Regional integration must fundamentally demand an adequate legal and institutional framework to ask cooperation and strengthen its integration, resulting for members in advancing regional integration. Its success depends greatly on necessary political environment. We cannot indicate a single road to regional integration and cooperation. Regional organizations such as EU, the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the like reflect a changing international system requiring their mechanism.

A certain governance in regional political scopes can constitute global

governance as a whole. While high regional governability has the effective condition to supplement and contribute to global governance, it may not produce a positive outcome automatically. Meanwhile, various regional mechanisms spread themselves unevenly and in different gradations across the world. At any rate, what matters is rather that regionalism is beyond the framework of state-centric governance.

Non-state actors, transnational actors, and subnational actors: The global system now involves 20,000 non-governmental organizations with different transnational and global-wide values. There is evidence in plenty to show that the necessary and desirable activities for global governance can no longer be effectively performed without transnational actors, and in particular NGOs. Although the process over value-allocation among states mainly focuses on issue-areas of territory, security, alliance, armaments, namely, high politics, its process now increasingly enlarges the scope of issue-areas as far as economic, socio-cultural, and ecological issues, namely, low politics. There seems little doubt that the new and old issue-areas unable for states to resolve have extremely increased, and that the role and capability able to cope adequately with and control the process over value-allocation for global society have largely declined and weakened. International Red Cross, Amnesty International, anti-war movements, World Council of Churches, and so on are not controlled in large measure by states. NGOs can directly or indirectly participate in the process of decision-making over global value-allocation, resulting in settling problems. Various NGOs arrange or resolve issues and more contribute to constructing global governance.

Furthermore, pressure groups, ethnic groups, trade unions, public opinion, guerrilla, local community, political movements, class struggle, individuals, citizen, human beings, and the like can join, beyond border, the decision-making process over global value-allocation. In general, it is no wonder that

while their subnational actors subject to state sovereignty and its decision-making, they within most of states can preserve their considerable autonomy to act, and can influence on the process over value-allocation among states to attain their values. Not surprisingly, such tendencies are true of local governments and bureaucratic agencies of national governments, pressure groups, public opinion, and social movements. They seem to reflect, in reality, more value or interest of subnational groups than one of states. These actors are inclined to take actions in the process to quest for their own values and interests as well as global values and interests. As long as the international system structure gives impacts directly or indirectly on subnational actors and the governments unable to arrange effectively their impacts, non-state actors have to reflect their own values and interests on the global system. We must underline that the emergence and strength of subnational actors have already respond to the demand of the decentralization and multipolarization of the process over value-allocation in the global system. The global system provides non-state actors with favorable sphere of activities by means of the benefits of specialization.

Much the same can be said about individuals. Generally speaking, individuals can so often influence the process over value-allocation of international society through social movements or social groups, public opinion. In consequence, "as the non-state actors provide citizens with access to decision-makers, they will be more frequently used by individuals interested in shaping the policy agenda."³⁵⁾

As individuals become to be conscious of complicated and difficult problems beyond nation-states, and demand to participate in the process over complex value-allocation for the global politics, they can gradually increase self-consciousness as mankind, with the result of being able to behave partly as the member of mankind. Certainly, the international system too cannot but generally take into consideration human values such as

peace, welfare, freedom, environmental sustainability, human rights of all mankind. With globalization, the increase and role growth of their subnational actors are the cause and effect of the reduction of state-centric governance, resulting in helping to construct, maintain, and develop global governance³⁶⁾.


Global civil society: "The potential for problem-solving is greatest in those countries where actors from civil society make a fruitful contribution to the political running of the country. Because state institutions in many areas of politics no longer have the autonomy of action needed to shape policy independently of the societal actors affected by it, institutions of civil society are requiring increasing importance as a rectificatory authority and as participants in the formative process."³⁷⁾ This is same of global civil society³⁸⁾ in global governance. As noted above, in order to solve global problems and conflicts, it is non-state actors, transnational actors, and in particular NGOs constituting global civil society that can contribute to effective building of global governance. Global civil society is likely to national civil society; the latter itself supports the former. Global civil society composed of NGOs, transnational actors, international regimes, subnational actors, and the like can occupy a major part of global governance.

Put it another, global civil society is equal to a complex framework of various and multiple sub-subgovernance of global governance. No wonder that global civil society, viz. transnational civil society developed at same pace with complex interdependence across manifold states, societies, and regions. National governments "share power with a medley of nongovernmental agencies-business and labor groups as well as NGOs. Together they form expanding networks of institutions designed to meet a wide range of human need."³⁹⁾

All things concerned, it is evident that global governance is constituted

by two sub-global governance: state-centric governance and non-state-centric governance, in particular, global civil society. Put differently, “[g]lobal governance, once viewed primarily as concerned with intergovernmental relationships, now involves not only governments and intergovernmental institutions but also non-governmental organizations(NGOs), citizens’ movements, transnational corporations, academia, and the mass media.”⁴⁰⁾ These may give birth to global civil governance. And then, as Figure 3 shows, their factors creates a global governance system.

Figure 3



Still more, what has to be noticed is that, besides these governing parts of global governance, there are conceived as governing parts like regionalism. We must add functionalism, federalism, collective security, multinationalism, neofunctionalism, and so on to them. These ideas, forces, and institutions reflect the functional needs of states, and are able to cover most of major activities through states. To be sure, they continue to diminish state sovereignty, resulting for non-state actors in displaying, instead of states, capability of global governance⁴¹⁾. In particular, we should

direct a great interest to multilateralism. Needless to say, multilateralism signifies "not merely that it coordinates national policies in groups of three or more states, which is something that other organizational forms also do, but additionally that it does so on the basis of certain, principles of ordering relations among those states."⁴²⁾ while multilateralism overlaps other sub-subgovernance, it is now occupying an important position in global politics.

6. The Development and Transformation of Global Governance

The structure of global governance is mainly composed of state-centric governance and non-state-centric governance. Needless to emphasize, the distinction of both spheres, in practice, seems to be opaque. For example, international regimes have two faces: state-centric governance and non-state-centric one. What is essential is the relationship between the former and the latter. "Global civil society aims not to overturn the state system, but it does represent a different set of priorities than those traditionally associated with the state system, and it is in this respect that it represents a phenomenon worthy of broad theoretical analysis." Global civil society has not a mutually exclusive relationship to state-centric governance⁴³⁾. Although there are fundamentally state-centric governance and non-state-centric one, the former still remains relatively more dominant than the latter. However, the former, in all likelihood, is gradually decreasing its position, capacity, and significance, with the result for the latter of being increasing proportionately its position and scope.

We should ask an essential question of the development and orientation of global governance: what future development can we predict appreciately? : what global governance can we look for adequately? : how can we construct, maintain, and develop a desirable global governance?

It is little doubt that the nature, content, and type of global governance are likely to change continually with the transformation of world politics. In the changing process of the global system, new global problems, conflicts, and situations have appeared one after another. These will demand some new global governance. What global governance should we build in the future? So, we should reinvestigate the content of governance. Generally speaking, global governance entirely means routinized arrangement, problem-solving mechanisms in the global level. Rather the essence of global governance lies in the basis on the concept of how to manage conflicting situations, to govern critical problems, or to control bad situations, but not to transform a crises structure itself. What is more important is that there two aspects of global governance: negative governance meaning to arrange or control concrete incompatibility of value among actors, and positive governance signifying to tranform a fundamental structure supporting incompatibility of value at the global scale. That is to say, the former is called status quo-oriented global governance; the latter is reform-oriented global governance. The latter may also be called global co-governance, or emancipatory governance, bottom-up governance. Generally speaking, status-quo oriented governance, like state-centric one, is build on the foundation of symmetrical relationship between actors like between great powers. Such a governance implies governance of horizontal relationship among actors. Non-status-quo oriented governance, like global civil society, is constructed on the basis of asymmetrical relationship between multiple actors. Such a governance is governance of vertical relationship among asymmetrical actors.

This is necessarily not to seem that while the former is wrong, the latter is good, that the former and the latter are under an incompatible opposing relationship, and that only the latter should essentially be build in the future. what is the most important is that we should build the framework

of the global governance able to make it possible to be consistent with two kinds of global governance within the orientation of integrative perspective. What is at stake here is what global governance we should build. We must point out five pillars of global governance. The structure of global governance involves five crucial elements of global governance, namely, five sub-global governance; global peace (demilitarization), global economic equity, global guarantee of human rights, global mutual understanding (realization of national, ethnic, local, genders', individuals', human beings', identities), global environmental sustainability⁴⁴⁾.

The building, maintaining, and developing of global governance does not suggest not only the building of world government, but also the realization of objectives through world government. To make it possible to construct a desirable global governance lies in various actors, system, and movements; states, international organizations, international regimes, regionalism, multilateralism, public-social movements, international opinions, NGOs, global-domestic civil society, and so on.

How can diverse actors, without world government, constitute global governance able to arrange, settle, control apprehensively global problems and conflicts in terms of cooperation. A desirable global governance implies not status-quo one but anti-status-quo one through the cooperation networks among diverse actors and institutions to make it possible to cooperate among them, resulting in building successfully anti-status-quo global governance, it is necessary for them to transform some value-views regarding the global system. These are whole-oriented value-view, common-oriented value-view, equality-oriented value-view, long term-oriented value-view, and bottom-up-oriented value-view⁴⁵⁾.

First, it is not difficult for actors to change and transform fundamentally behaviours, values, and value-views. Many ideas, thoughts, and value-views may make it possible to transform some reality or status-quo forces and

movements, with the result of new realities. First of all, we must stress anti-status-quo value-view.

Second, in the global system, actors (parts) must locate their own value in whole value of the global system. Such an orientation can make it possible to build a situation of compatible value between a part and the whole, resulting in preserving and developing the part's own value. Every actor must take a holistic value-allocation perspective. Every actor has to form a situation of compatible value only through cooperation.

Third, an actor has to create a common value with others without sacrificing its own value as well as other's own values. By establishing a common value between actors, each one can realize its own value. Especially, global problems and conflicts can be settled by constituting a new common value. To put it differently, we should direct attention to a new type of non-zero sum value. Multilateralism can entail the coordination of the behaviour of states on the basis of generalized fundamentally principles of contract⁴⁶⁾. The search for global governance in the global conflict system relies on multilateralist solutions, reciprocity, international integration, and regionalism.

Fourth, in the global system, every actor should establish a structure of equal allocation of value. Conflicts generally stems from social structure with an unequal allocation of value. Since the existence of the structure produces a situation and behaviour of incompatible value, the haves of values must redistribute it to the have nots. As long as the asymmetrical relationship of value-allocation between actors will not be transformed, most conflicts cannot be settled for a long time. The more equally value is allocated, the more peacefully the global system becomes⁴⁷⁾.

Fifth, when an actor tries to constitute the content of his own value, he must set it within a long time span. Unless an actor sets the content of value within a short time span, he may enhance the situation and


behaviour of incompatible value in relation to others. For the actor tends to pursue selfish-oriented values without considering a changing condition over value. It is possible for actors to get a common value.

Sixth, in the global system, an actor must decide value from the standpoint of the bottom (periphery) of the system. This does not mean to negate completely the value of the top (center). What is important is that an actor, by reconsidering value from upper, must naturally avoid pursuing the center's value-oriented value with taking into consideration the value of periphery, viz. the Third World. Since an actor of the center has a status quo-oriented value and policy, there are few opportunities to transform the global structure of unequal value. By considering an unequal structure from the periphery of the global system, the asymmetrical relationship of value between the haves and the have-nots can be transformed into a symmetrical relationship. With reconstructing value from lower, the weak party can take on its own policy against the status quo forces. By such a policy, a whole-oriented value system can be constructed. Through reconstructing a non-status quo-oriented paradigm of global governance, it is possible for status quo-oriented governance to be transformed into a desirable global governance.

On the basis of such the framework of value of global governance, as Figure 4 suggests, we can fundamentally construct non-status quo-oriented global governance through a cooperation system supported by cooperative international system; international organizations, international regimes, international law, international practices, reciprocity, multilateralism, regionalism, public-social movements, public opinions, global civil society, and the like, namely, non-status quo-oriented global governance. It is necessary to understand that global governance must have two orientations: upper-down governance and bottom-up governance. Accordingly, what deserves to be pointed out is that we must ultimately build a good global

governance unnecessary to contribute to a world government⁴⁸⁾. We must search for non-status quo-oriented global governance. Global governance must essentially become a framework of governing rule capable, for the weakest and the most disadvantaged of local, nation, state, region, people, and minority under global problems and conflicts, of gaining the largest value and interest.

Figure 4 Globality-centric Governance



Notes

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- 7) However, we cannot necessarily discover any differences among three approaches. Their differences are ambiguous. For they, in reality, focus on the idea of governance without government.
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- 10) Stoker, Gerry, *op. cit.*, p. 18.
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- 42) Ruggie, John Gerard, "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution," in Ruggie, John Gerard, ed., *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form* (New York : Columbia University Press, 1993), p.7. Furthermore, for the more analysis of this problem, see Keohane, Robert O., "Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research," *International Journal*, Vol. 45, No.4 (1990), pp. 731-64; Cox, Robert, *Programme on Multilateralism and the United Nations System, 1990-1995* (Tokyo: The United Nations University Press, 1991); Gill, Stephen, ed., *Globalization, Democratization and Multilateralism* (Tokyo: The United Nations University Press, 1997).
- 43) Turner, Scott, *op. cit.*, p. 39.
- 44) See Hoshino, Akiyoshi, *Prospect for Global Politics: Change, Conflict, Governance, and Peace in Globalization* (Tokyo: Teihan, 1997), pp. 131-36 and 224-46.
- 45) *Ibid.*, pp. 252-53.
- 46) Ruggie, John Gerald, "Multilateralism :the Anatomy of an Institution," pp. 3-47.
- 47) Brown, Seyom, *International Relations in a Changing Global System: Toward a Theory of the World Polity* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 139-40.
- 48) Dower, Nigel, *op. cit.*, p. 189.